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Abstract
In many situations, agents are involved in an allocation problem that is followed by
another allocation problem whose optimal solution depends on how the former problem
has been solved. In this paper, we take this dynamic structure of allocation problems
as an institutional constraint. By assuming a finite number of allocation problems, one
for each period/stage, and by assuming that all agents in society are involved in each
allocation problem, a dynamic mechanism is a period-by-period process. This process
generates at any period-t history a period-t mechanism with observable actions and
simultaneous moves. We also assume that the objectives that a planner wants to achieve
are summarized in a social choice function (SCF), which maps each state (of the world)
into a period-by-period outcome process. In each period t, this process selects for each
state a period-t socially optimal outcome conditional on the complete outcome history
realized up to period t− 1. Heuristically, the SCF is one-step-ahead implementable if
there exists a dynamic mechanism such that for each state and each realized period-
t history, each of its subgame perfect Nash equilibria generates a period-by-period
outcome process that coincides with the period-by-period outcome process that the
SCF generates at that state from period t onwards. We identify a necessary condition
for SCFs to be one-step-ahead implemented, one-step-ahead Maskin monotonicity, and
show that it is also suffi cient under a variant of the condition of no veto-power when
there are three or more agents. Finally, we provide an account of welfare implications
of one-step-ahead implementability in the contexts of trading decisions and voting
problems.
JEL Classification Code: D47, D71
Key-words: Implementation, subgame-perfect equilibrium, partial equilibrium
analysis.
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1. Introduction
The theory of implementation investigates the goals that a planner can achieve when
these goals depend on private information held by various agents. The problem of the
planner is to design a mechanism or game form in which the agents’incentives dovetail to
an equilibrium outcome that coincides with the planner’s goal. When such a mechanism
exists, his goal is fully implementable. This paper studies full implementation problems in
a dynamic environment, in which:
• A finite number of agents interacts for a finite number of periods/stages and they
commonly observe the state (of the world) before starting interacting.1
• The central planner delegates the achievement of period-t goal to period-t planner, who
designs a period-t mechanism (or game form) with observed actions and simultaneous
moves.
• A period-t environment consists of a set of agents, a set of period-t outcomes and
agents’preferences over those outcomes. An agent’s preferences over period-t outcomes
endogenously depend on planners’future goals as well as planners’decisions taken in
the past.
• The period-t planner aims to solve his implementation problem by devising a period-
t mechanism (one after each outcome history), which asks agents to report only the
information pertaining to his problem and which gives the agents the appropriate
incentives so that a period-t “socially desirable” outcome results from the strategic
behavior of the agents. The period-t planner aims to solve his implementation problem
in a way that makes the implementation problems of future planners solvable.
• The period-t planner aims to implement a socially desirable period-t outcome after any
outcome history - even after off-equilibrium histories - and cannot punish agents over
periods.
Many real-world allocation problems have the above dynamic structure. For example,
in democratic societies, the identity of governments may change over time due to periodic
elections, the policy variables chosen by the current government affect the optimal decisions
of future governments and, moreover, the current government handles its decision problem
without being able to commit to future policy variables (see, e.g., Persson and Tabellini,
2000; Krusell et al., 1997).2 Also, in a market, today trading affects future trading activities,
and the role of the market maker is to facilitate trade period-by-period but not to make
a commitment related to future trading activities, or to enforce them over time (see, e.g.,
Radner, 1972, 1982; and Prescott and Mehra; 1980). More generally, the above set-up is
justified by the fact that in many real-life situations, agents are involved in an allocation
problem that is followed by another allocation problem, whose optimal solution depends on
1We assume finite periods for the sake of simplicity. Our framework extends to infinite periods by imposing
a Markovian kind of refinement condition: Strategies depend only on outcome histories.
2We have in mind a situation in which governments share the same agenda.
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how the former problem has been solved. This dependence is evident when agents have
non-separable preferences.3
In this paper, we take this dynamic structure of allocation problems as an institutional
constraint. Given that the goal of implementation theory is to study the relationship between
outcomes in a society and the mechanisms under which those outcomes arise, it is important
to throw light on how such an institutional constraint affects outcomes in society. In this
paper, we ask the following question: If we take the described dynamic structure as an
institutional constraint, can one describe the requirements on social choice functions (SCFs)
that are equivalent to subgame-perfect Nash implementability by a sequence of period-t
mechanisms?
This paper answers the above question by assuming that every agent in society is in-
volved in each period-t mechanism and that there are T periods. Moreover, it does it by
assuming that the SCF is a (complete) contingent plan of action: In every period t, the SCF
specifies a period-t socially desirable outcome conditional on the outcome history realized up
to period t− 1. We make this assumption due to our institutional constraint and due to the
notion of subgame perfection. More precisely, given that the sequence of allocation problems
can only be solved period-by-period, given that the optimal solution to period-t allocation
problem depends on how the previous allocation problems have been solved, and given that
there is a positive, albeit small, probability that agents make mistakes when they carry
out their intended actions - this is one of the assumptions on which the notion of subgame
perfect equilibrium is based, it is compelling to assume that the SCF is a period-by-period
process that assigns an optimal solution to period-t allocation problem that depends on the
complete outcome history realized up to period t− 1. Therefore, the SCF f is defined as a
list of period-t SCFs,
(
f 1 [·] , ..., fT [·|·]
)
, one for each period t, such that each period-t SCF
f t depends on the state θ and on the outcome history realized up to period t− 1. Observe
that period-1 SCF f 1 depends only on the state θ.
Given that the sequence of period-t mechanisms can be thought of as one “large”dy-
namic mechanism, let us denote this dynamic mechanism by Γ. Before introducing our notion
of implementation, it will be useful to develop some terminology. A period-t history ht is a
sequence of choices made by agents from period 1 to an intermediate period t−1. A period-τ
history hτ is consistent with a period-t history ht when ht is the initial part of hτ . Since by
assumption every agent is involved in each period-t mechanism, an agent’s (pure) strategy
si assigns a feasible action to every period-t history ht. This paper uses subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium as the equilibrium concept for solving, after every period-t history ht, the
dynamic game that the dynamic mechanism Γ (ht) may lead to. Since each agent’s strategy
is a complete contingent plan of action, a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium strategy profile
s of the dynamic game (Γ (ht) , θ) generates a period-by-period outcome process, in the sense
that s specifies an equilibrium outcome for every period-τ history that is consistent with ht.
The following notion of one-step-ahead implementation is adopted. A SCF f is one-
step-ahead implementable if there exists a dynamic mechanism Γ such that for each state
θ and each period-t history ht, the following two requirements hold. (a) The period-by-
3Note that even when preferences over consumption sequences are separable across periods, like in the
standard discounted utility preferences, the corresponding preferences defined over sequences of outcomes
such as trades are generically non-separable across periods.
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period outcome process generated by f at state θ from period t onwards coincides with
the period-by-period outcome process generated by at least one (pure) subgame-perfect
equilibrium strategy profile of the dynamic subgame (Γ (ht) , θ). (b) Every subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium strategy profile of (Γ (ht) , θ) generates a period-by-period outcome process
that coincides with the period-by-period outcome process generated by SCF f at state θ from
period t onwards.
Under our notion of implementation, we provide a necessary condition, called one-step-
ahead Maskin monotonicity. This condition is an adaptation to our framework of the funda-
mental property for Nash implementation, now widely referred to as Maskin monotonicity
(Maskin, 1999). Maskin monotonicity says that if x is socially optimal at θ but not at θ′,
then the outcome x must have fallen strictly in someone’s ordering at the state θ′. To intro-
duce our variant of Maskin monotonicity, note that in every period-t environment each agent
ranks period-t outcomes according to her period-t reduced preferences, which are induced
by means of backward induction. This means that a period-t reduced preference ordering
over the set of period-t outcomes depends on past decisions as well as on the socially opti-
mal path that the dynamic process f will bring about in the future. Thus, one-step-ahead
Maskin monotonicity requires that every period-t feasible SCF must be Maskin monotonic
with respect to period-t reduced preferences. A period-t SCF is feasible when it is Maskin
monotonic, after every feasible outcome history.4
Furthermore, if for every period t, the period-t SCF satisfies the condition of no veto-
power with respect to period-t reduced preferences, we show that the necessary conditions
are also suffi cient. The dynamic mechanism we construct to achieve the full implementation
uses the Maskin mechanism in each period, not only on the equilibrium path but also out-of-
equilibrium path.5 The reason is that period-t planner can neither punish agents over time
nor compensate agents in the future when they deviate from a socially undesirable period-t
outcome. Though the implementing dynamic mechanism may look complicated, the idea
behind it is very simple. Indeed, it can be thought of as a tree (finite directed graph) in
which a Maskin mechanism corresponds to each node and in which each node corresponds
to a history. Each branch emanating from a node can be thought of as a possible outcome
that players can achieve via the mechanism. Then, given a node, the corresponding Maskin
mechanism associated with this node simply asks players to report their ranking of branches
(plus some tie-breaking information). Note that when a player points out his best branch,
she reveals only a partial information about which sequence of outcomes she wants to achieve.
For instance, in a consumption-saving model, the period-t planner asks agents to report how
much they would like to save/consume in the current period but not to report the full time
sequence of consumption/saving. The implementability of a SCF is determined by whether
such a one-step-ahead manner is enough for extracting information necessary for it.
Finally, we provide an account of welfare implications of our suffi ciency result in the
context of trading decisions and voting problems.
Firstly, we consider a borrowing-lending model with no liquidity constraints, in which
agents trade in spot markets and transfer wealth between any two periods by borrowing and
4There can be (infeasible) histories that make the period-t SCF not Maskin monotonic.
5It is worth emphasizing here that we do not intend to seek a contribution to this static-game part.
However, once the feasibility condition and one-step-ahead Maskin monotonicity are met, we are forced to
accept the conclusions of static implementation.
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lending. In this set-up, intertemporal pecuniary externalities arise because today’s trade
changes tomorrow’s spot price, which, in turn, affects its associated equilibrium allocation.
The quantitative implication of this is that every agent’s reduced preference concerns not
only her own consumption/saving behavior but also the consumption/saving behavior of all
other agents. Under such a pecuniary externality, we show that the standard sequential
competitive equilibrium (or Radner) solution is not one-step-ahead implementable because
it is not one-step-ahead Maskin monotonic (see Claim 1 below). We have also identified
preference domains - which involve no pecuniary externalities - for which the sequential
competitive equilibrium solution is definable and one-step-ahead implementable. It is worth
emphasizing that when we focus on non-contingent SCFs (or correspondences), the sequential
competitive solution reduces to the Walrasian solution under certainty, and this solution
is implementable in Nash equilibrium, and so in subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, when
Walrasian equilibrium allocations on the boundary of the feasible set are ruled out.6 The
reason is that in this case the Walrasian solution satisfies Maskin monotonicity, which is
a necessary condition for implementation in Nash equilibrium (Hurwicz et al, 1995). This
means that the additional requirement of the paper that implementation should be achieved
in a one-step-ahead manner is indeed important and binding (see section 1.1. for a more
elaborated discussion).
Secondly, we consider a bi-dimensional policy space where an odd number of agents vote
sequentially on each dimension and where an ordering of the dimensions is exogenously given.
We assume that each voter’s type space is unidimensional, that a majority vote is organized
around each policy dimension and that the outcome of the first majority vote is known to
the voters at the beginning of the second voting stage. This dynamic resolution is common
in political economy models (see, e.g., Persson and Tabellini, 2000). In this environment, we
show that the simple majority solution, which selects the Condorcet winner in each voting
stage, is one-step-ahead implementable. In this process, we explicitly state the conditions on
the utility function of each voter that are needed for this SCF to be well-defined and show
that this is the case. As established by De Donder et al (2012) for the case where there is
a continuum of voters, the assumption that both dimensions are strategic complements, as
well as the requirement that the induced utility of both dimensions is increasing in the type
of the voter, are particularly important for guaranteeing the existence of a Condorcet winner
in each voting stage.
1.1 Related Literature
The fundamental paper on implementation is thanks to Maskin (1999; circulated since
1977), who proves that any choice rule that can be Nash implemented satisfies a remarkably
strong invariance condition, now widely referred to as Maskin monotonicity. Moreover, he
shows that when the mechanism designer faces at least three agents, a choice rule is Nash
implementable if it is Maskin monotonic and satisfies the condition of no veto-power.7
Since Maskin’s result, economists have also been interested in understanding how to
circumvent the limitations imposed by Maskin monotonicity by exploring the possibilities
6For a discussion of the so-called boundary problem see, for instance, Lombardi and Yoshihara (2017) and
references therein.
7For a full characterization see, for instance, Lombardi and Yoshihara (2013).
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offered by approximate (as opposed to exact) implementation (Matsushima, 1988; Abreu
and Sen, 1991), as well as by implementation in refinements of Nash equilibrium (Moore and
Repullo, 1988; Abreu and Sen, 1990; Palfrey and Srivastava, 1991; Herrero and Srivastava,
1992; Jackson, 1992) and by repeated implementation (Kalai and Ledyard, 1998; Lee and
Sabourian, 2011; Mezzetti and Renou, 2017).
Moore and Repullo (1988)’s result and Abreu and Sen (1990)’s result say that for many
non-contingent SCFs, one can design an extensive game form that yields unique imple-
mentation in subgame-perfect Nash equilibria.8 They find that the class of implementable
non-contingent SCFs is dramatically expanded by the use of extensive game forms. Our im-
plementation model differs from the standard model of implementation in subgame-perfect
Nash equilibria for two reasons. First, whereas the Moore-Repullo mechanism allows each
player to change her mind in later stages so as to overturn outcome decisions made in the
previous stages (because decisions are finalized only when the game reaches a terminal node),
this is not allowed in our dynamic mechanism. The reason is that in our model a social out-
come is chosen and finalized in each period. Thus, though in our dynamic mechanism each
player can always change his mind as events unfolds, he cannot change finalized outcomes
(i.e., past outcome decisions), but he can change future outcome decisions. For instance,
let us consider the problem of consumption/saving allocations over time, in which agents
care about consumption/saving streams. In the Moore-Repullo mechanism, the object of
choice is a consumption/saving stream, and agents can deviate in each period from their
plans so as to change the entire consumption/saving stream. In our mechanism, agents can
deviate in period t from their plans but they can only affect consumption/saving decisions
that will be made from period t onwards. Second, we are interested in implementing a social
contingent plan rather than sequences of social outcomes. In terms of results, we find that
we cannot escape the limitations imposed by Maskin monotonicity. Thus, and in contrast to
implementation of non-contingent SCFs in subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, we have that
our notion of implementation can be robust to small perturbations from complete informa-
tion. The reason is that if a choice rule is not Maskin monotonic but is implementable in
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, then there are small perturbations from complete infor-
mation under which an undesirable perfect Bayesian equilibrium appears (see Aghion et al.,
2012).
The paper on dynamic implementation, which is closest to ours, in particular because
it allows for non-separable preferences and outcomes are chosen on a stage-by-stage basis,
is Penta (2015). This author extends the belief-free approach to robust mechanism design
in dynamic environments, in which agents obtain information over time. In contrast to
previous research, agents do not know their own payoff types at the outset: payoff-types
are disclosed over time, and known only in the last period. By modelling agents’beliefs
separately from agents’information - which is encoded in the payoff types, Penta finds that
robust full implementation imposes stronger condition that, for all possible beliefs, all the
Perfect Bayesian Equilibria induce outcomes consistent with the SCF. More importantly,
he also shows that, for the weaker notion of interim perfect equilibrium, the set of all such
equilibria can be computed by means of a recursive procedure which combines the logic of
8For a full characterization of the class of social choice rules that are implementable in subgame perferct
Nash equilibria see Vartiainen (2007).
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rationalizability and backward induction reasoning. Therefore, and similar to our result,
by transforming the original dynamic problem into an artificial sequence of static problems,
the backwards procedure enables Penta to build on the insights of the static literature to
obtain suffi cient conditions that guarantee that all the strategies consistent with this solution
concept are truthful. However, and in contrast to our implementation model, Penta considers
only non-contingent SCFs.
Further, our dynamic problems contrast with the repeated implementation problems
studied by Lee and Sabourian (2011) and Mezzetti and Renou (2017), in which agents’
period-t preferences are time-separable and they change randomly from one period to the
next one. Indeed, in our setup, the evolution of agents’period-t preferences are established
as an endogenous process, because they depend on past social decisions and on planners’
future goals.
The endogenous evolution of agents’information is a common feature in the most recent
literature on dynamic mechanism design (see, e.g., Bergemann and Välimäki, 2010; Athey
and Segal, 2013; Pavan et al., 2014; Eső and Szentes, 2017), though this literature maintains
the assumption of separability of preferences and focuses on partial implementation.
Finally, our implementation problems also contrast with the static implementation prob-
lems studied by Hayashi and Lombardi (2017), in which planners solve their implementation
problems simultaneously and do not communicate with each other. Indeed, in our setup, a
period-t planner observes the outcome history and this history affects his implementation
problem.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the theoretical
framework and outlines the basic implementation model. Section 3 presents our necessary
and suffi cient conditions. Section 4 covers one-step-ahead implementable SCFs in the context
of trading and voting problems. Section 5 concludes. Appendix includes proofs not in the
main body.
2. Basic framework
Let us imagine that a set of agents indexed by i ∈ I ≡ {1, · · · , I} have to decide
what outcome is best in each time period/stage indexed by t ∈ T ≡ {1, 2, · · · , T}. Let us
denote the universal set of period-t outcomes by X t, with xt as a typical outcome. Thus,
the universal set of outcome paths available to agents is the space:
X ⊆
∏
t∈T
X t,
with x as a typical outcome path. The t-head x−t is obtained from the path x ∈ X by
omitting the last t components, that is, x−t ≡ (x1, · · · , xt−1), the t-tail is obtained from x by
omitting the first t − 1 components, that is, x+t ≡
(
xt, · · · , xT
)
, and we identify (x−t, x+t)
with x. The same notational convention will be followed for any profile of outcomes. We
will refer to the t-head x−t as the past outcome history x−t.
The feasible set of period-t+1 outcomes available to agents depends upon past outcome
history x−(t+1), that is, X t+1
(
x−(t+1)
)
⊆ X t+1 for every period t 6= T .
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We write F t for the collection of functions defined as follows:
F t ≡
{
f t|f t : X−t → X t such that f t
[
x−t
]
∈ X t
(
x−t
)}
, for all t 6= 1.
We also write F for the product space X1 ×F2 × · · · × FT .
The information held by the agents is summarized in the concept of a state, which is a
complete description of the variable characterizing the environment. Write Θ for the domain
of possible states, with θ as a typical state. For every period t ≥ 2, the description of the
variable characterizing the environment after the outcome history x−t is denoted by θ|x−t.
Moreover, for every t ≥ 2 we write θ|x−t, x+(t+1) for a complete description of the variable
characterizing the environment in period t after the outcome history x−t and the future sure
outcome path x+(t+1).
In the usual fashion, we assume that agent i’s preference ordering in state θ admits a
utility representation Ui (·, θ) : X → R.
2.1 Implementation model
Dynamic social objectives
The goal of the central planner is to implement a social choice function (SCF) f : Θ→ F
that assigns to each state θ a dynamic “socially optimal period-by-period outcome”process
f [θ] =
(
f 1 [θ] , f 2 [θ|·] , · · · , fT [θ|·]
)
,
where:
• f 1 [θ] ∈ X1 is the period-1 socially optimal outcome and
• f t [θ|·] ∈ F t is the period-t socially optimal process that selects the socially optimal
outcome f t [θ|x−t] in period t ≥ 2 at the state θ after the past outcome history x−t ∈
X−t.
To save writing, for every period t 6= 1 and every past outcome history x−t, we write
f+t [θ|x−t] for the t-tail path of socially optimal outcomes in state θ that follows the past
outcome history x−t, whose period-τ element is the value of the composition f τ ◦f τ−1◦· · ·◦f t
at θ|x−t; that is:
f+t
[
θ|x−t
]
≡
(
f τ
[
θ|x−t
])
τ≥t
where f τ [θ|x−t] ≡ (f τ ◦ f τ−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f t) [θ|x−t] for every period τ ≥ t. The image or range of
the period-t function f t of the SCF f at the past outcome history x−t is the set:
f t
[
Θ|x−t
]
≡
{
f t
[
θ|x−t
]
|θ ∈ Θ
}
, for every x−t ∈ X−t with t 6= 1.
The image or range of the period-1 function f 1 of the SCF f is the set f 1 [Θ] ≡ {f 1 [θ] |θ ∈ Θ}.
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Dynamic mechanism
The central planner delegates the achievement of period-t goal, denoted by f t [·|·] if
t 6= 1 and by f 1 [·] if t = 1, to period-t planner, who designs a period-t mechanism (or game
form) with observed actions and simultaneous moves. We assume that the actions of every
agent are perfectly monitored by every other agent as well as that every agent chooses an
action in period t without knowing the period t action of any other agent.
More formally, in the first period all agents i ∈ I choose actions from nonempty choice
sets Ai (h1), where h1 ≡ ∅ denotes the initial history. Thus, the period-1 action space is the
product space:
A
(
h1
)
≡
∏
i∈I
Ai
(
h1
)
,
with a (h1) ≡ (a1 (h1) , · · · , aI (h1)) as a typical period-1 action profile.
Suppose that in period 1 agents have played the action profile a (h1) ≡ a1. In the
second period, agents know the history h2 ≡ a1, and the actions that every agent i ∈ I has
available in period 2 depends on what has happened previously. Then, let Ai (h2) denote the
period-2 nonempty action space of agent i when the history is h2 and let A (h2) denote the
corresponding period-2 nonempty action space, which is defined by:
A
(
h2
)
≡
∏
i∈I
Ai
(
h2
)
,
with a (h2) ≡ (a1 (h2) , · · · , aI (h2)) as a typical period-2 action profile.
Continuing iteratively, we can define ht, the (nontrivial) history at the beginning of
period t > 1, to be the list of t− 1 action profiles,
ht ≡
(
a1, a2, · · · , at−1
)
,
identifying actions played by agents in periods 1 through t − 1. We let Ai (ht) be agent i’s
nonempty action set in period t when the history is ht and let A (ht) be the corresponding
period-t action space, which is defined by:
A
(
ht
)
≡
∏
i∈I
Ai
(
ht
)
,
with a (ht) ≡ (a1 (ht) , · · · , aI (ht)) as a typical profile of actions.
We assume that in each period t, every agent and period-t planner know the history
ht, this history is common knowledge at the beginning of period t, and that every agent
i ∈ I chooses an action from the action set Ai (ht). We also assume that in each period t,
all agents i ∈ I choose actions simultaneously.
We let H t be the set of all period-t histories, where we define H1 to be the null set, and
let
H ≡
⋃
t∈T
H t
be the set of all possible histories.
For any nontrivial history ht ≡ (a1, a2, · · · , at−1) ∈ H, define a subhistory of ht to be a
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sequence of the form (a1, · · · , am) with 1 ≤ m ≤ t − 1, and the trivial history consisting of
no actions is denoted by ∅.
Thus, the implementation of the goals is achieved by means of a dynamic mechanism
Γ ≡ (I, H,A (H) , g), where H is the set of all possible histories, A (H) is the set of all
profiles of actions available to agents, defined by
A (H) ≡
⋃
h∈H
A (h) ,
and g ≡
(
g1, · · · , gT
)
is a sequence of outcome functions, one for each period t ∈ T , with
the property that: a) the outcome function g1 assigns to period-1 action profile a (h1) ∈
A (h1) a unique outcome in X1, and b) for every period t 6= 1 and every nontrivial history
h ≡ (a1, a2, · · · , at−1) ∈ H t, the outcome function gt assigns to each period-t action profile
a (h) ∈ A (h) a unique outcome in X t (g−t (h)).
The submechanism of a dynamic mechanism Γ that follows the history ht is the dynamic
mechanism
Γ
(
ht
)
≡
(
I, H|ht, A
(
H|ht
)
, g+t
)
,
where H|ht is the set of histories for which ht is a subhistory of h ∈ H|ht,
A
(
H|ht
)
≡
⋃
h∈H|ht
A (h)
is the set of all profiles of actions available to agents from period t to period T , and g+t is
t-tail of the sequence g that begins with period t after the history ht such that for every
hT ≡
(
a1, · · · , aT−1
)
∈ HT |ht and every a
(
hT
)
∈ A
(
hT
)
it holds that g
(
hT , a
(
hT
))
=(
g−t
(
hT , a
(
hT
))
, g+t
(
hT , a
(
hT
)))
.
One-step-ahead implementation
A dynamic mechanism Γ and a state θ induce a dynamic game (Γ, θ) (with observed
actions and simultaneous moves). The subgame of the dynamic game (Γ, θ) that follows the
history ht ∈ H is the dynamic game (Γ (ht) , θ).
Let Ai ≡
⋃
h∈H
Ai (h) be the set of all actions for agent i ∈ I. A (pure) strategy for agent
i is a map si : H → Ai with si (h) ∈ Ai (h) for every history h ∈ H. Individual i’s space of
strategies, Si, is simply the space of all such si.
A strategy profile s ≡ (s1, · · · , sI) is a list of strategies, one for each agent i ∈ I.
The strategy profile s−i is obtained from s by omitting the ith component, that is, s−i
= (s1, · · · , si−1, si+1, · · · , sI), and we identify (si, s−i) with s.
For any strategy si of agent i and any history ht in the dynamic mechanism Γ, the
strategy that si induces in the dynamic subgame (Γ (ht) , θ) is denoted by si|ht. Individual
i’s space of strategies that follows history ht is denoted by Si|ht. The period-t strategy of
agent i is sometimes denoted by sti.
For every dynamic game (Γ, θ), the strategy profile s∗ is a Nash equilibrium of (Γ, θ) if
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for every agent i ∈ I it holds that:
Ui
(
g
(
s∗i , s
∗
−i
)
, θ
)
≥ Ui
(
g
(
si, s
∗
−i
)
, θ
)
for every si ∈ Si.
Let NE (Γ, θ) denote the set of Nash equilibrium strategy profiles of (Γ, θ).
Moreover, for every dynamic game (Γ, θ) and every nontrivial history ht ∈ H, the
strategy profile s∗|ht is a Nash equilibrium of (Γ (ht) , θ) if for every agent i ∈ I and a given
past outcome history g−t (ht) ∈ X−t it holds that:
Ui
((
g−t
(
ht
)
, g+t
(
s∗i |ht, s∗−i|ht
))
, θ
)
≥ Ui
((
g−t
(
ht
)
, g+t
(
si|ht, s∗−i|ht
))
, θ
)
for every si|ht ∈ Si|ht. Let NE (Γ (ht) , θ) denote the set of Nash equilibrium strategy profiles
of (Γ (ht) , θ).
A strategy profile s∗ is a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of a dynamic game (Γ, θ) if
it holds that:
s∗|ht ∈ NE
(
Γ
(
ht
)
, θ
)
, for every history ht ∈ H.
Let SPE (Γ, θ) denote the set of SPE strategy profiles of (Γ, θ), with sθ as a typical element.
Definition 1 A dynamic mechanism Γ ≡ (I, H,A (H) , g) implements the SCF f : Θ→ F
in SPE if for every θ ∈ Θ and every history ht ∈ H, the following two conditions hold:
(a) There exists sθ ∈ SPE (Γ (ht) , θ) such that f τ [θ|g−τ (hτ )] = gτ
(
sθ (hτ )
)
for every
hτ ∈ H|ht if ht 6= h1 is not a trivial history, otherwise, g1
(
sθ (h1)
)
= f 1 [θ] and
f τ [θ|g−τ (hτ )] = gτ
(
sθ (hτ )
)
for every hτ ∈ H\H1.9
(b) For every sθ ∈ SPE (Γ (ht) , θ), f τ [θ|g−τ (hτ )] = gτ
(
sθ (hτ )
)
for every hτ ∈ H|ht if
ht 6= h1 is not a trivial history, otherwise, g1
(
sθ (h1)
)
= f 1 [θ] and f τ [θ|g−τ (hτ )] =
gτ
(
sθ (hτ )
)
for every hτ ∈ H\H1.
If such a mechanism exists, the SCF f is said to be one-step-ahead implementable.
In other words, part (a) requires that for each state θ and each period-t history ht,
the socially optimal period-by-period outcome process generated by f at state θ, after the
outcome history g−t (ht), coincides with the period-by-period outcome process generated by
at least one subgame-perfect equilibrium strategy profile of the dynamic subgame (Γ (ht) , θ).
Part (b) requires that for each state θ and each period-t history ht, every subgame-perfect
equilibrium strategy profile of the dynamic subgame (Γ (ht) , θ) generates a period-by-period
outcome process that coincides with the socially optimal period-by-period outcome process
generated by f from period t onwards, conditional to the outcome history associated with
ht, that is, conditional on g−t (ht).
The above definition captures the idea that under our institutional constraint, the central
planner is forced to delegate the achievement of social objectives to several planners, who have
to decide and execute them in a one-step-ahead manner. However, the central planner wishes
9Recall that H1 = {∅} and that H|ht is the set of histories for which ht is a subhistory of hτ ∈ H|ht.
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to be mindful of what can happen along the way because there is a positive, albeit small,
probability that players make mistakes.10 For this reason, he requires that for each state θ,
each period t and every period-t history ht, that is, after every out-of-equilibrium period-t
history as well as every period-t equilibrium history, every subgame-perfect equilibrium of
the dynamic subgame (Γ (ht) , θ) generates a period-by-period outcome process that coincides
with the socially optimal period-by-period outcome process that the SCF f generates at state
θ after the realization of the outcome history associated with ht.
The above definition is based on two tacit assumptions. The first one is that after each
out-of-equilibrium history as well as each equilibrium history, the period-t designer assumes
that agents are sequentially rational and that he expects that agents will play equilibrium
strategies from period t onwards. The second assumption is that every history ht matters.
This implies that after an outcome history x−t, when the period-t designer devises the
period-t action space and the period-t outcome function, he cannot limit his attention only
to equilibrium histories resulting in x−t. Indeed, if he behaves in this way, he may fail to
one-step-ahead implement f . This point is made clear in example 2 below. Note that these
two assumptions are not in contradiction with the equilibrium concept of subgame perfect
equilibrium, which, indeed, is based on them.
3. Necessary and suffi cient conditions
3.1 One-step-ahead Maskin monotonicity
A condition that is central to the Nash implementation thanks to Maskin (1999) is an
invariance condition, now widely referred to as Maskin monotonicity. This condition says
that if an outcome x is socially optimal at the state θ and this x does not strictly fall in
preference for anyone when the state is changed to θ′, then x must remain a socially optimal
outcome at θ′. An equivalent statement of Maskin monotonicity follows the reasoning that
if x is socially optimal at θ but not socially optimal at θ′, then the outcome x must have
fallen strictly in someone’s ordering at the state θ′ in order to break the Nash equilibrium via
some deviation. Therefore, there must exist some (outcome-)preference reversal if a Nash
equilibrium strategy profile at θ is to be broken at θ′. Let us formalize that condition as
follows: For any state θ and any agent i and any outcome x ∈ X, the lower contour set of
Ui (x, θ) is defined by Lθ (x, Ui) ≡ {y ∈ X|Ui (x, θ) ≥ Ui (y, θ)}. For any set Z ⊆ X and
any x ∈ Z, the lower contour set of Ui (x, θ) restricted to Z is defined by LθZ (x, Ui) ≡ {y ∈
Z|Ui (x, θ) ≥ Ui (y, θ)}. Therefore:
Definition 2 The SCF F : Θ → X is Maskin monotonic with respect to Z ⊆ X provided
that for all θ̄, θ ∈ Θ, if Lθ̄Z(F
(
θ̄
)
, Ui) ⊆ LθZ(F
(
θ̄
)
, Ui) for every i ∈ I, then F
(
θ̄
)
= F (θ).
We basically require an adaptation of Maskin monotonicity to each period-t implemen-
tation problem. In other words, one-step-ahead Maskin monotonicity requires that every
period-t social choice function f t is Maskin monotonic. To formalize this condition, we need
additional notation and requirements.
10This is one of the assumptions on which the notion of subgame perfect equilibrium is based.
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For a SCF to be one-step-ahead Maskin monotonic it must be feasible. This requirement
is derived by using the approach developed by Moore and Repullo (1990) and thus it is stated
in terms of the existence of certain sets. These sets are denoted by Y−t, Y 1 and Y t (y−t) and
represent respectively the set of feasible past outcome histories up to period t 6= 1, the set
of period-1 attainable outcomes and the set of period-t attainable outcomes after the past
outcome history y−t. Formally, this first part of the condition can be stated as follows:
(i) The SCF f : Θ → F is feasible if there is a collection of spaces of sequences of past
outcomes {Y−t}t∈T \{1}, there is a period-1 outcome space Y 1 ≡ Y−2 and there is a
collection of period-t outcome spaces
{
{Y t (y−t)}y−t∈Y−t
}
t∈T \{1}
such that
a) f 1 [Θ] ⊆ Y 1 and f t [Θ|y−t] ⊆ Y t (y−t) for every t 6= 1;
b) for every t 6= 1, it holds that
y−t ∈ Y−t ⇐⇒ y1 ∈ Y 1 and yτ ∈ Y τ
(
y−τ
)
for every 2 ≤ τ ≤ t.
A SCF satisfying the above requirement is said to be a feasible SCF. This condition
requires the existence of some feasibility constraints represented by the sets Y−t, Y 1 and
Y t (y−t). As the proof of Theorem 1 below will show, the set Y 1 depends on the range
of g1, whereas the set Y t (y−t) depends on the range of gt, where y−t = g−t (h) for some
history h ∈ H t. This means that the set Y 1 can be a proper subset of X1 and that Y t (y−t)
can be a proper subset of X t. Moreover, the reason of the existence of the set Y−t is
that there can be infeasible outcome histories x−t after which the SCF f is not one-step-
ahead implementable. The existence of the set Y−t is guaranteed by defining it by Y−t ≡
{g−t (h) ∈ X−t|for some h ∈ H t}, for every t 6= 1. This set entails that in order to implement
a SCF in one step-ahead manner there must exist some degree of coordination between the
current designer and the future designers, in the sense that the current designer takes into
account not just his goal by also the future goals in his design. To see it clearly, see example
1 below. This is in line with our definition of implementation. The reason is that if Γ one-
step-ahead implements f , then after every history, the period-t action space and the period-t
outcome function are such that they make the implementation problems of future designers
solvable, as well as solving the period-t implementation problem. The example below also
shows that the requirement of feasibility is not trivial.
Example 1 Let I ≡ {1, 2}, T ≡ {1, 2} and Θ ≡ {θ, θ′, θ′′, θ′′′}. Suppose that the set X t
consists of three distinct period-t outcomes, X t = {xt, yt, zt}, for each t ∈ T , and that the
set X is X ≡X1 ×X2. Agent i’s utility function is Ui (a1, a2, η) = u1i (a1, η) + u2i (a2, η) for
all (a1, a2) ∈ X and all η ∈ Θ, where uti (·, η) is agent i’s period-t utility function. The
per-period utilities are summarized in the tables below.
u11 (·, θ) = u12 (·, θ′) u11 (·, θ′) = u12 (·, θ) u11 (·, θ′′) = u12 (·, θ′′) u11 (·, θ′′′) = u12 (·, θ′′′)
x1 1 1 0 0
y1 1 0 1 -1
z1 0 2 -1 1
12
u21 (·, θ) = u22 (·, θ) u21 (·, θ′) = u22 (·, θ′) u21 (·, θ′′) = u22 (·, θ′′) u21 (·, θ′′′) = u22 (·, θ′′′)
x2 0 0 0 0
y2 0 0 1 -1
z2 0 0 -1 1
Finally, let the SCF f be defined as follows: f 1 [θ] = f 1 [θ′] = x1, f 1 [θ′′] = y1, f 1 [θ′′′] = z1,
f 2 [θ|x1] = f 2 [θ′|x1] = f 2 [θ′′|x1] = f 2 [θ′′′|x1] = x2, f 2 [θ|y1] = f 2 [θ|z1] = f 2 [θ′′|y1] =
f 2 [θ′′|z2] = y2 and f 2 [θ′|y1] = f 2 [θ′|z1] = f 2 [θ′′′|y1] = f 2 [θ′′′|z2] = z2.
We will show that this SCF cannot be one-step-ahead implemented if period-1 designer
neglects period-2 SCF f 2. To see it, suppose that period-1 designer designs agent i’s period-1
action space by setting A1i (∅) ≡ {a1i , â1i }, for each agent i ∈ I, and he defines the period-
1 outcome function g1 as illustrated in the table below. In this table, the two columns
correspond to the two the possible actions of agent 2, the two rows correspond to the two
possible actions of agent 1, and the outcomes in each box are the outcomes to the action
profile to which the box corresponds.
a12 â
1
2
a11 x
1 y1
â11 z
1 x1
Whatever the agents believe will happen in period 2, the unique period-1 Nash equilibrium
of the period-1 mechanism is (a11, a
1
2) in state θ, (â
1
1, â
1
2) in state θ
′, (a11, â
1
2) in state θ
′′ and
(â11, a
1
2) in state θ
′′′. These equilibria result in socially optimal outcomes, that is, x1 =
g1(a11, a
1
2) = f
1 [θ], x1 = g1(â11, â
1
2) = f
1 [θ′], y1 = g1(a11, â
1
2) = f
1 [θ′′] and z1 = g1(â11, a
1
2) =
f 1 [θ′′′]. Therefore, period-1 designer solves his implementation problem. However, this
makes impossible for the period-2 designer to solve his.
To see it, assume, to the contrary, that there is a dynamic mechanism Γ that one-step-
ahead implements f and that it is such that its period-1 action space is A (∅) = {a11, â11} ×
{a12, â12} and its period-1 outcome function is g1. Thus, by implementability of f , we can
define Y 1 = X1 = {g1 (h) ∈ X1|h ∈ A (∅)}. Part (b) of requirement (i) implies that Y−2 =
Y 1, whereas its part (a) implies that f 2 [Θ|x1] = {x2} ⊆ Y 2 (x1) and f 2 [Θ|b] = {y2, z2} ⊆
Y 2 (b) for b ∈ {y1, z1}. The fact that f 2 [Θ|y1] = {y2, z2} ⊆ Y 2 (y1) implies that the range
of period-2 outcome function g2 of Γ, after the outcome history y1, must contain at least
y2 and z2. Given that, by our initial assumption, agents are indifferent between period-2
outcomes at the states θ and θ′, it follows that y2 and z2 are two Nash equilibrium outcomes
of the period-2 game (A (a11, â
1
2) , g
2, u21 (·) , u22 (·)), which contradicts the assumption that Γ
one-step-ahead implements f . Note that the same conclusion is reached when one considers
the outcome history z1.11
Next, let us introduce the other requirements. Solving backward, for any feasible
past outcome history y−T , agent i’s period-T reduced utility in state θ at y−T , denoted
11When Θ =
{
θ, θ′
}
, one can see that Γ can one-step-ahead implement f if the range of period-1 outcome
function is
{
x1
}
, so that this outcome is the only possible period-2 outcome history. Indeed, it is not diffi cult
to see that when Θ =
{
θ, θ′
}
any dynamic mechanism in which the range of period-t outcome function gt is
equal to the set {xt}, for each t ∈ T , one-step-ahead implements f .
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by Ui
[
·, θ|y−T
]
, is equal to:
Ui
[
yT , θ|y−T
]
≡ Ui
(
y−T , yT , θ
)
(1)
for every yT ∈ Y T
(
y−T
)
. We denote by U
[
θ|y−T
]
the profile of period-T reduced utilities
at θ|y−T and by U
[
Θ|y−T
]
the period-T domain of reduced utilities at Θ|y−T .12 Therefore,
the second part of the condition is represented by the requirements (ii)-(iv) below.
(ii) The period-T SCF fT is Maskin monotonic with respect to Y T
(
y−T
)
and U
[
Θ|y−T
]
provided that for all θ̄, θ ∈ Θ, if for every i ∈ I,
LθY T (y−T )
(
fT
[
θ|y−T
]
, Ui
[
·, θ|y−T
])
(2)
⊆ Lθ̄Y T (y−T )
(
fT
[
θ|y−T
]
, Ui
[
·, θ̄|y−T
])
,
then fT
[
θ|y−T
]
= fT
[
θ̄|y−T
]
.
Next, suppose that in our way back to period 1 we have reached period t 6= 1, T and that
y−t is a feasible past outcome history. Given that in our framework rationality is common
knowledge between the players and given that the objective of the central planner is to
implement a dynamic social choice process prescribed by the SCF f , every player will "look
ahead" and a period-t outcome yt will be evaluated at the past outcome history y−t as well
as at the future sure outcome path f+(t+1) prescribed by the SCF in response to the outcome
history path (y−t, yt). On this basis, agent i’s period-t reduced utility in state θ at the past
outcome history y−t and at the future sure outcome path prescribed by the social process
f+(t+1), denoted by Ui
[
·, θ|y−t, f+(t+1)
]
, is equal to:
Ui
[
yt, θ|y−t, f+(t+1)
]
≡ Ui
(
y−t, yt, f+(t+1)
[
θ|
(
y−t, yt
)]
, θ
)
(3)
for every yt ∈ Y t (y−t). Let us denote by U
[
θ|y−t, f+(t+1)
]
the profile of period-t reduced
utilities at θ|y−t, f+(t+1) for t 6= 1, T and by U
[
Θ|y−t, f+(t+1)
]
the period-t domain of reduced
utilities at Θ|y−t, f+(t+1). Therefore, as for the first part of the condition, the second part
can be stated as follows:
(iii) The period-t SCF f t is Maskin monotonic with respect to Y t (y−t) and U
[
Θ|y−t, f+(t+1)
]
provided that for all θ̄, θ ∈ Θ, if for every i ∈ I,
LθY t(y−t)
(
f t
[
θ|y−t
]
, Ui
[
·, θ|y−t, f+(t+1)
])
(4)
⊆ Lθ̄Y t(y−t)
(
f t
[
θ|y−t
]
, Ui
[
·, θ̄|y−t, f+(t+1)
])
,
then f t [θ|y−t] = f t
[
θ̄|y−t
]
.
12That is, U
[
θ|y−T
]
≡
(
Ui
[
·, θ|y−T
])
i∈I and U
[
Θ|y−T
]
≡
{
U
[
θ|y−T
]
|θ ∈ Θ
}
.
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Reasoning like that used in the preceding paragraphs, agent i’s period-1 reduced utility
in state θ at the outcome path prescribed by the social process f+2, denoted by Ui [·, θ|f+2],
is equal to:
Ui
[
y1, θ|f+2
]
≡ Ui
(
y1, f+2
[
θ|y1
]
, θ
)
(5)
for every y1 ∈ Y 1. Denoting the profile of period-1 reduced utilities at θ|f+2 by U [θ|f+2],
and the period-1 domain of reduced utilities at Θ|f+2 by U [Θ|f+2], the third part of the
condition can be stated as follows:
(iv) The period-1 SCF f 1 is Maskin monotonic with respect to Y 1 and U [Θ|f+2] provided
that for all θ̄, θ ∈ Θ, if for every i ∈ I,
LθY 1
(
f 1 [θ] , Ui
[
·, θ|f+2
])
⊆ Lθ̄Y 1
(
f 1 [θ] , Ui
[
·, θ̄|f+2
])
, (6)
then f 1 [θ] = f 1
[
θ̄
]
.
The condition of one-step-ahead Maskin monotonicity can be stated as follows:
Definition 3 A SCF f : Θ → F is one-step-ahead Maskin monotonic provided that it is
a feasible SCF, that every period-t SCF f t is Maskin monotonic with respect to Y 1 and
U [Θ|f+2] if t = 1, with respect to Y −t (y−t) and U
[
Θ|y−t, f+(t+1)
]
, for every y−t ∈ Y−t, if
t 6= 1, T , and with respect to Y −T (y−t) and U
[
Θ|y−T
]
, for every y−t ∈ Y−t, if t = T .
Our second result is that only one-step-ahead Maskin monotonic SCFs are one-step-
ahead implementable.
Theorem 1 If I ≥ 2 and the SCF f : Θ → F is one-step-ahead implementable, then it is
one-step-ahead Maskin monotonic.
Proof. See Appendix.
Before closing this subsection, let us show, by means of an example, that given an
outcome history x−t, if the period-t mechanism designer devises the period-t action space
and the period-t outcome function by taking into account only equilibrium histories resulting
in this outcome history, as well as expecting that agents will follow equilibrium strategies
in the future, he may fail to one-step-ahead implements f . The reason is that according to
our notion of implementation, the period-t mechanism designer needs to achieve a socially
optimal decision irrespective of whether he is on equilibrium path or not. Continuing the
analogy of the implementing dynamic mechanism with a tree (see introduction), the period-t
mechanism designer must select the right branch and, at the same time, he needs to take into
account the fact that he may be at a wrong node. Note that this is nothing but the spirit of
subgame-perfection, and in this sense of our notion of implementation is not in contradiction
with our equilibrium notion.
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Example 2 Let I ≡ {1, 2}, T ≡ {1, 2} and Θ ≡ {θ, θ′}. Suppose that the set X t consists
of three distinct period-t outcomes, X t = {xt, yt, zt}, for each t ∈ T , and that the set X is
X ≡X1×X2. Agent i’s state-dependent utility function is Ui (a1, a2, η) = u1i (a1, η)+u2i (a2, η)
for all (a1, a2) ∈ X and all η ∈ Θ, where uti (·, η) is agent i’s period-t state-dependent utility
function. The per-period utilities are summarized in the tables below.
u11 (·, θ) = u12 (·, θ′) u11 (·, θ′) = u12 (·, θ)
x1 2 2
y1 2 0
z1 0 4
u21 (·, θ) u22 (·, θ) u21 (·, θ′) u22 (·, θ′)
x2 2 1 0 0
y2 0 0 1 1
z2 1 2 2 2
Finally, let the SCF f be defined as follows: f 1 [θ] = f 1 [θ′] = x1, f 2 [θ|x1] = x2, f 2 [θ′|x1] =
y2, f 2 [θ|y1] = f 2 [θ|z1] = f 2 [θ′|y1] = f 2 [θ′|z1] = z2. Though f is one-step-ahead Maskin
monotonic, we will show that designers may fail to implement it if, in their design, they
focus only on equilibrium histories.
To check that f is one-step-ahead Maskin monotonic, let Y 1 = {x1, y1, z1} = Y−2,
Y 2 (x1) = {x2, y2} and Y 2 (y1) = Y 2 (z1) = {y2, z2}. By definition of these sets, it is clear
that f is feasible. Also, one can easily check that f t is Maskin monotonic, for each t ∈ T .
Thus, f is one-step-ahead Maskin monotonic.
Suppose that period-1 designer designs the period-1 action space and the period-1 out-
come function as illustrated in example 1 above. Suppose that period-2 designer ignores out-
of-equilibrium histories that result in the outcome history x1 when he designs the period-2
action space and the period-2 outcome function. To this end, suppose that period-2 designer
defines them as follows.
• If the period-1 play has been (a11, a12), then A1 (a11, a12) × A2 (a11, a12) = {(a21, a22)} and
g2 (a21, a
2
2) = x
2.
• If the period-1 play has been (â11, â12), then A1 (â11, â12) × A2 (â11, â12) = {(â21, â22)} and
g2 (â21, â
2
2) = y
2.
• If the period-1 play has been (a11, â12) or (â11, a12), then A1 (a11, â12) × A2 (a11, â12) =
A1 (â
1
1, a
1
2)× A2 (â11, a12) = {(ā21, ā21)} and g2 (ā21, ā22) = z2.
Note that the game form faced by agents is as follows.
a12 â
1
2
a11 x
1 + x2 y1 + z2
â11 z
1 + z2 x1 + y2
Whatever the agents believe will happen in period 2, the unique period-1 Nash equilib-
rium is (a11, a
1
2) in state θ, whereas the unique period-1 Nash equilibrium is (â
1
1, â
1
2) in state
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θ′. Both result in the socially optimal outcome x1 = f 1 [θ] = f 1 [θ′]. Given this period-1
equilibrium behavior, the socially optimal outcome (x2 at θ or y2 at θ′) is selected in period
2. Thus, the socially optimal outcomes are selected on the equilibrium paths. Note that if
the period-1 outcome history is either y2 or z2, the socially optimal outcome is still selected
in period 2. However, the above dynamic mechanism fails to one-step-ahead implement f
because it fails to select the period-2 socially optimal outcome if in period 1, the agents have
played (a1, a2) when the true state is θ′ or played (â1, â2) when the true state is θ.
Note that this dynamic mechanism makes the SCF f not feasible. To see it, suppose
that it one-step-ahead implements f . Take x1. Let us consider the case where h2 = (a1, a2),
so that g1 (h2) = x1. In this case, let us define the set of period-2 obtainable outcomes
Y 2 (g1 (h2)) by Y 2 (g1 (h2)) = {g2 (a2 (h2)) ∈ X2|a2 (h2) ∈ A (h2)} = {x2}. Similarly, we
have that Y 2
(
g1
(
ĥ2
))
= {y2} in the case where ĥ2 = (â1, â2). One can now see that both
sets fail to meet part (a) of requirement (i), which is a contradiction.
As mentioned above, the SCF f is one-step-ahead Maskin monotonic. Indeed, we show
below that it is implementable. To see this, consider the following dynamic mechanism. The
period-1 action space and the period-1 outcome function are as before. The period-2 action
spaces and the period-2 outcome function g2 are as follows.
• If the period-1 play has been either (a11, a12) or (â11, â12), then Ai (h2) = {a2i , â2i } for each
i ∈ I and the period-2 outcome function g2 is as illustrated in the table below.
a22 â
2
2
a21 x
2 y2
â21 y
2 x2
• Otherwise, let Ai (h2) = {ā2i , ã2i } for each i ∈ I and the period-2 outcome function g2
is as illustrated in the table below.
ā22 ã
2
2
ā21 z
2 y2
ã21 y
2 z2
When x1 is the period-1 outcome history, at state θ, both (a21, a
2
2) and (â
2
1, â
2
2) are
period-2 Nash equilibria, with outcome x2. When x1 is the period-1 outcome history, at
state θ′, both (a21, â
2
2) and (â
2
1, a
2
2) are period-2 Nash equilibria, with outcome y
2. Then, the
socially optimal outcome is selected in period 2 after the outcome history x1. Moreover, let
b1 ∈ {y1, z2} be the period-1 outcome history. At both states, both (ā21, ā22) and (ã21, ã22) are
period-2 Nash equilibria, with outcome z2. Again, the socially optimal outcome is selected
in period 2 after the period-1 outcome history b1. Thus, f is one-step-ahead implementable.
3.2 The characterization theorem
In the abstract Arrovian domain, the condition of no veto-power says that if an outcome
is at the top of the preferences of all agents but possibly one, then it should be chosen
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irrespective of the preferences of the remaining agent: that agent cannot veto it. Formally,
this property can be stated as follows for an abstract outcome space X:13
Definition 4 A SCF F : Θ  X satisfies no veto-power with respect to Z ⊆ X provided
that for all θ ∈ Θ and all x ∈ Z, if∣∣{i ∈ N |Z ⊆ LθZ (x, Ui)}∣∣ ≥ n− 1,
then x = F (θ).
As a part of suffi ciency, we require an adaptation of the above definition to each period-t
implementation problem. In other words, one-step-ahead no veto power requires that each of
period-t function f t defined over period-t domain of reduced utilities satisfies the condition
of no veto-power. The condition can be stated as follows:
Definition 5 A feasible SCF f : Θ → F satisfies one-step-ahead no veto-power provided
that every period-t SCF f t satisfies the condition of no veto-power with respect to Y 1 and
U [Θ|f+2] if t = 1, with respect to Y −t (y−t) and U
[
Θ|y−t, f+(t+1)
]
, for every y−t ∈ Y−t, if
t 6= 1, T , and with respect to Y −T (y−t) and U
[
Θ|y−T
]
, for every y−t ∈ Y−t, if t = T .
Our characterization of one-step-ahead implementable SCFs can thus be stated as fol-
lows:14
Theorem 2 Let I ≥ 3. If a SCF f : Θ → F satisfies one-step-ahead Maskin monotonicity
and one-step-ahead no veto-power, then it is one-step-ahead implementable.
Proof. See Appendix.
4. Implications
4.1 Impossibility of implementing the dynamic competitive solu-
tion
In this section, we investigate whether the trading rule as considered in the dynamic
general equilibrium framework is indeed one-step-ahead implementable.
When it is literally understood, the concept of Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie (ADM) (Arrow
and Debreu, 1954; McKenzie,1954) equilibrium says that all the agents meet on the first day
of their life and write down a contract on all the deliveries of consumption contingent on
every date-event, and simply commit to it. A more realistic description of trading over time
is by Radner (1972, 1982), which considers that at each period agents can trade only between
current consumption and assets to be carried over to the next period. To our knowledge,
however, the Radner-type model has not been given a strategic foundation. In the Radner
model prices are defined only for on-path situation and it is left unclear what prices should be
13For any finite set S, |S| denotes the cardinality of S.
14Note that the sets with respect to which f satisfies one-step-ahead maskin monotonicity and one-step-
ahead no veto-power are the same.
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formed in off-path situations, while a strategic outcome function in a dynamic environment
must specify prices and allocations even at off-path histories. In fact, as far as the markets
are sequentially complete ADM equilibrium and Radner equilibrium are equivalent (Arrow,
1964). This means that from strategic viewpoints the Radner model cannot escape the
problem which the ADM model has. The competitive models are silent about what prices
and allocations should be formed after the society makes mistake.
Strategic implementation of competitive solutions in general involves a strange story:
each agent is supposed to behave as a price-taker, despite he is aware that message he sends
may affect the market price. In the static setting, these apparently contradicting natures
can be made compatible by making the mechanism nicely so that agents face a kind of
coordination game in which they are induced to agree on prices in equilibrium. In fact, the
(feasibility-constrained version of) ADM solution is Nash-implementable.
Being a price-taker is harder in dynamic environments, however, when social decision
and execution can be made only in a sequential manner. It requires that every agent perceives
that he cannot affect spot price/interest rate at any period, in particular that the amount of
asset to carry over to the future does not affect the spot prices/interest rates in the future,
despite he is aware that messages he sends may affect the market price in both the current
period and the future periods, and that equilibrium prices and allocations in the future
periods are a function of whole allocations in the current period including his own.
Below we explain the nature of the problem and see whether the Radner-type solution
can clear this bar.
For the sake of convenience, we assume that there are only three consumption periods
(CPs), and so two trading periods (TPs), and that there is one perfectly divisible commodity
in each CP. In TP1 agents transfer consumption between CP1 and CP2, and in TP2 they
transfer consumption between CP2 and CP3.
In TP1, agents sell/buy consumption in CP1 and buy/sell consumption in CP2. In
TP2, agents sell/buy consumption in CP2 and buy/sell consumption in CP3. Let q1 be the
TP1 spot price, the relative price of CP2 consumption for CP1 consumption, and q2 be the
TP2 spot price, the relative price of CP3 consumption for CP2 consumption.
Each agent i is endowed with an amount ωti of the commodity in CPt. The total
endowment of the commodity in CPt is denoted by ωt. Agent i’s consumption set is R3+, and
her consumption in CPt is denoted by cti. In state θ, this agent has preference ordering over
consumption sequences in her consumption set. Endowments are given once and for all, and
therefore an economy is described by a state θ.
The domain assumption is that at each economy θ ∈ Θ agent i’s preference ordering <θi
is represented by an additively separable utility function
Ui(c
1
i , c
2
i , c
3
i , θ) = v
1
i (c
1
i , θ) + v
2
i (c
2
i , θ) + v
3
i (c
3
i , θ).
This guarantees that all consumption goods in CP1, CP2 CP3 are gross-substitutes of each
other and the ADM and Radner equilibrium is unique.
We describe feasible allocations by using net trade vectors. Let
H =
{
z ∈ RI |
∑
i∈I
zi = 0
}
,
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which is the set of closed net trades. Thus, the set of closed net trade vectors for TPt can
be defined by
Zt = H t ×H t+1, for t = 1, 2.
A TPt net trade allocation is thus a vector zt = (ztt, ztt+1) in Zt, where the ith element ztti
of ztt denotes agent i’s net trade of consumption in CPt, and where the ith element ztt+1i of
ztt+1 denotes agent i’s net trade of consumption in CP(t+ 1).
The set of feasible net trade allocations over the two trading periods is denoted by Z
and defined by
Z =
{
(z1, z2) ∈ Z1 × Z2|ω1i + z11i ≥ 0, ω2i + z12i + z22i ≥ 0, ω3i + z23i ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I
}
.
The set of feasible TP1 net trade allocations is given by
Z̄1 = {z1 ∈ Z1|(z1, z2) ∈ Z for some z2 ∈ Z2},
while the set of TP2 net trade allocation, conditional on z1, is given by
Z̄2(z1) = {z2 ∈ Z2|(z1, z2) ∈ Z}, for all z1 ∈ Z̄1.
In economy θ ∈ Θ, agent i’s utility function Ui over consumption sequences induces a
utility function Vi over the set of feasible net trade allocations Z in the natural way: for all
z, ẑ ∈ Z,
Vi (z, θ) ≥ Vi (ẑ, θ)
⇐⇒
Ui(ω
1
i + z
11
i , ω
2
i + z
12
i + z
22
i , ω
3
i + z
23
i , θ) ≥ Ui(ω1i + ẑ11i , ω2i + ẑ12i + ẑ22i , ω3i + ẑ23i , θ).
Though the utility Ui (·, θ) exhibits separability over consumption sequences, the derived
utility Vi (·, θ) over Z is typically non-separable since consumption in CP2 depends on net
trades in both TP1 and TP2.
We provide the definition of competitive equilibrium backward. The definition of equi-
librium when we start from TP2 is straightforward.15
Definition 6 For every economy θ ∈ Θ and every z1 ∈ Z̄1, the net trade allocation
f 2 [θ|z1] ∈ Z̄2 (z1) constitutes a TP2 competitive net trade allocation, conditional on z1,
if there is a TP2 spot price q2[θ|z1] such that for every agent i this allocation f 2 [θ|z1] solves
the following problem:
Maximize
z2∈Z̄2(z1)
Ui(ω
1
i + z
11
i , ω
2
i + z
12
i + z
22
i , ω
3
i + z
23
i , θ)
subject to z22i + q
2[θ|z1]z23i ≤ 0.
15Note that this is a feasibility-constrained version. As it is known that the ADM solution fails to satisfy
Maskin monotonicity when it results in boundary allocations, and it is necessary to modify the solution by
truncating each agent’s consumption set by the set of feasible allocations. Here each individual’s admissible
set of trades is truncated by Z̄2
(
z1
)
, although it does not matter when we can restrict attention to interior
allocations.
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Let Vi[·, θ|f 2] denote agent i’s TP1 reduced utility over the set of feasible TP1 net trade
allocations, Z̄1, and be defined by
Vi[x
1, θ|f 2] ≥ Vi[y1, θ|f 2]
⇐⇒
Vi(x
1, f 2[θ|x1], θ) ≥ Vi(y1, f 2[θ|y1], θ) (7)
for all x1, y1 ∈ Z̄1.
In contrast to static pure exchange economies where each agent’s preferences are defined
over her own net trade vectors, in sequential trading, each agent must have preferences over
whole TP1 net trade allocations. This is due to the presence of intertemporal pecuniary
externalities. Indeed, an outcome of the trading rule in TP2 depends on the net trade
allocation assigned in TP1, because trading in TP1 affects the values of endowments in the
next trading period. Moreover, the period-1 induced preference ordering may be non-convex.
In order for it to be a convex preference ordering, it is required that the TP2 function f 2
that maps every economy, conditional on past trades, into a TP2 net trade allocation be a
concave function, but this requirement fails for any reasonable trading rule. As is known,
although convexity is no more than a suffi cient technical condition for things to work, it
becomes extremely diffi cult to establish any reasonable solution once it is violated.
We may proceed in two ways. First, we can still define a concept of competitive equi-
librium following the tradition of dynamic general equilibrium theory.
Definition 7 For every economy θ ∈ Θ, a TP1 net trade allocation f 1 [θ] ∈ Z̄1 constitutes
a TP1 competitive net trade allocation if there is a TP1 spot price q1[θ] such that for every
agent i the net trade allocation profile (f 1 [θ] , f 2 [θ|f 1 [θ]]) solves the following problem:
Maximize
z∈Z
Ui(ω
1
i + z
11
i , ω
2
i + z
12
i + z
22
i , ω
3
i + z
23
i , θ)
subject to z11i + q
1[θ]z12i ≤ 0,
z22i + q
2[θ|f 1 [θ]]z23i ≤ 0.
This is consistent with the existing dynamic general equilibrium framework, in the sense
that agents take the price path as given. Note that it assumes that each agent perceives that
her saving choice does not affect either TP1 spot price q1[θ] or TP2 spot price q2[θ|f 1 [θ]],
despite that in the next period the spot price q2[θ|z1] is affected by whole z1 which includes
his own trade vector z1i .
The path of consumptions given by this solution is equivalent to the ADM solution.16
This solution is not one-step-ahead implementable, however. We prove this by means of an
example.
Claim 1 Let I ≥ 2. Then, the Radner solution, defined over Θ, is not one-step-ahead
Maskin monotonic.
16Note again that this is the feasibility-constrained version, while it does not matter when we can restrict
attention to interior allocations.
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Proof. Suppose that there are three agents, i, j and k. Assume that agents’intertemporal
endowments are as follows:
ωi = (ω
1
i , 0, 0), ωj = (0, ω
2
j , 0), ωk = (0, 0, ω
3
k),
where ω1i , ω
2
j , ω
3
k > 1. Each economy θ ∈ Θ = (0, 1] specifies a preference profile over
consumption paths represented by:
Ui(c
1
i , c
2
i , c
3
i , θ) = c
1
i + θ ln c
3
i , Uj(c
1
j , c
2
j , c
3
j , θ) = ln c
1
j + c
2
j , Uk(c
1
k, c
2
k, c
3
k, θ) = ln c
2
k + c
3
k.
Then, the TP2 spot price equilibrium is given by:
q2[θ|x1] = x12i ,
for all x1 ∈ Z̄1, and the TP2 competitive net trade allocation is given by:
f 22i [θ|x1] = −x12i , f 23i [θ|x1] = 1,
f 22j [θ|x1] = 0, f 23j [θ|x1] = 0,
f 22k [θ|x1] = x12i , f 23k [θ|x1] = −1,
for all x1 ∈ Z̄1.
The TP1 utilities over Z̄1 induced by TP2 competitive net trade allocations are repre-
sented respectively by:
Vi
[
x1, θ|f 2
]
= ω1i + x
11
i , Vj
[
x1, θ|f 2
]
= lnx11j + ω
2
j + x
12
j , Vk
[
x1, θ|f 2
]
= lnx12i + ω
3
k − 1,
for all x1 ∈ Z̄1, for all θ ∈ Θ.
For every economy θ ∈ Θ, the TP1 equilibrium spot price is:
q1[θ] = θ,
which results in the following TP2 equilibrium spot price:
q2[θ|f 1[θ]] = 1,
and in the following competitive equilibrium net trade allocations:
f 11i [θ] = −θ, f 12i [θ] = 1, f 22i [θ|f 1[θ]] = −1, f 23i [θ|f 1[θ]] = 1,
f 11j [θ] = θ, f
12
j [θ] = −1, f 22j [θ|f 1[θ]] = 0, f 23j [θ|f 1[θ]] = 0,
f 11k [θ] = 0, f
12
k [θ] = 0, f
22
k [θ|f 1[θ]] = 1, f 23k [θ|f 1[θ]] = −1.
We have found that f 1[θ] 6= f 1[θ′] for all θ,θ′ ∈ Θ with θ 6= θ′, though TP1 reduced
utility profiles are identical across economies in Θ, in violation of one-step-ahead Maskin
monotonicity.
When an agent reveals an intention to save more, there may be different reasons to do
so. It may be because he is simply patient, or it may be because he wants to manipulate the
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Radner equilibrium outcome in the next period. The period-1 planner does not distinguish
between those reasons. In particular, the above example is the case that no information is
revealed to the planner after TP1.
While we can induce agents to behave as price-takers in the static setting, it is thus
in general impossible to do that in the realistic dynamic setting in which social decision
and execution can be done only in a sequential manner. The problem will disappear when
there is a large number of traders, as each agent tends to be small and unable to manipulate
through intertemporal pecuniary externalities. Then we would say that the dynamic general
equilibrium model should be understood as such a limit model rather than an exact finite-
person model.
The second way is to find a domain in which an exact finite-person implementation is
possible. It is the domain such that there are no intertemporal pecuniary externalities.17
Condition 1 For all θ ∈ Θ, the TP2 spot price q2[θ|x1] is constant in x1 ∈ Z̄1.
Note that when the above condition is met, a TP2 competitive net trade vector assigned
to agent i depends only on her own past saving/borrowing behavior. For this reason, we
write f 22i [θ|z12i ] and f 23i [θ|z12i ] for f 22i [θ|z1] and f 23i [θ|z1] respectively.
Here are examples of domains which satisfy Condition 1. In what follows, let us focus on
economies where the quantity ωti is strictly positive for every agent i and every consumption
period t = 1, 2, 3.
Assumption 1 (Θ1) Assume that aggregate endowment is constant over time; that is,
ω1 = ω2 = ω3. Also, assume that the agents have identical discount factors, while they
may exhibit different elasticities of intertemporal substitution. That is, for every economy
θ ∈ Θ1 it holds that ω1 = ω2 = ω3 and that there is (β1, β2) such that every i’s preference
over consumptions is represented in the form:
Ui(c
1
i , c
2
i , c
3
i , θ) = vi(c
1
i , θ) + β
1vi(c
2
i , θ) + β
1β2vi(c
3
i , θ),
where:
• the sub-utility vi(·, θ) is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly
concave over R++.
• the limit of the first derivative of the sub-utility vi(·, θ) is positive infinity as cti ap-
proaches 0; that is, limcti→0
∂vi(c
t
i,θ)
∂cti
=∞.
• the limit of the first derivative of the sub-utility vi(·, θ) is zero as cti approaches positive
infinity; that is, limcti→∞
∂vi(c
t
i,θ)
∂cti
= 0.
• the sub-utility vi(·, θ) satisfies the requirement that −
(
∂2vi(c
t
i,θ)
∂2cti
cti/
∂vi(c
t
i,θ)
∂cti
)
< 1 for all
cti ∈ R++.
17Such situation emerges also when constant returns to scale in intertemporal production prevails, since
interest rate in such economy is constant.
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For this domain, we obtain that the TP2 competitive spot price, net trade allocations
and consumption allocations prescribed for every θ ∈ Θ1 are:
q2
[
θ|z1
]
= β2
f 22i
[
θ|z12i
]
= − β
2
1 + β2
·
(
z12i + ω
2
i − ω3i
)
f 23i
[
θ|z12i
]
=
1
1 + β2
·
(
z12i + ω
2
i − ω3i
)
c∗2i
[
θ|z1
]
= c∗3i
[
θ|z1
]
=
z12i + ω
2
i + β
2ω3i
1 + β2
, ∀i ∈ I and ∀z1 ∈ Z̄1.
Note that period-1 reduced utility on Z̄1 is represented by:
Vi
[
z1, θ|f 2
]
= vi
(
ω1i + z
11
i , θ
)
+β1
(
1 + β2
)
vi
(
z12i + ω
2
i + β
2ω3i
1 + β2
, θ
)
, ∀i ∈ I and ∀z1 ∈ Z̄1.
Assumption 2 (Θ2) In this domain we drop the assumption of constant aggregate endow-
ment over time, but we assume that agents have identical CES preferences. That is, for every
θ ∈ Θ2 there is a triplet (β1, β2, ρ) such that every i’s preference ordering over consumptions
is represented in the form:
Ui(c
1
i , c
2
i , c
3
i , θ) =
(c1i )
1−ρ
1− ρ + β
1 (c
2
i )
1−ρ
1− ρ + β
1β2
(c3i )
1−ρ
1− ρ , with ρ > 0.
When agents have identical CES preferences, we obtain that the TP2 competitive equi-
librium spot price, net trade allocations and consumption allocations prescribed for every
θ ∈ Θ2 are:
q2
[
θ|z1
]
= β2
(
ω2
ω3
)ρ
f 22i
[
θ|z12i
]
= −
z12i + ω
2
i − ω3i
(
ω2
ω3
)
1 + 1
β2
(
ω2
ω3
)1−ρ
f 23i
[
θ|z12i
]
=
ω3
ω2
·
z12i + ω
2
i − ω3i
(
ω2
ω3
)
1 + β2
(
ω3
ω2
)1−ρ
c∗2i
[
θ|z1
]
=
z12i + ω
2
i + β
2ω3i
(
ω2
ω3
)ρ
1 + β2
(
ω3
ω2
)1−ρ
c∗3i
[
θ|z1
]
=
ω3
ω2
· c∗2i
[
θ|z1
]
, ∀i ∈ I and ∀z1 ∈ Z̄1.
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Next, let us define a TP1 competitive equilibrium when Condition 1 is satisfied.
Definition 8 For every economy θ satisfying Condition 1, a TP1 net trade allocation f̂ 1 [θ] ∈
Z̄1 constitutes a backward TP1 competitive net trade allocation if there is a TP1 spot price
q1[θ] such that for every agent i the net trade allocation f̂ 1 [θ] solves the following problem:
Maximize
z1∈Z̄1
Ui(ω
1
i + z
11
i , ω
2
i + z
12
i + f
22
i
[
θ|z12i
]
, ω3i + f
22
i
[
θ|z12i
]
, θ)
subject to z11i + q
1[θ]z12i ≤ 0.
Using this definition, we obtain that the competitive equilibrium spot prices prescribed
for every economy θ ∈ Θ1 are:
q1 [θ] = β1 and q2
[
θ|f̂ 1 [θ]
]
= β2,
and so the competitive net trade allocations and the equilibrium consumption allocations
are for every agent i ∈ I as follows:
f̂ 11i [θ] = −
β1
1 + β1 + β1β2
·
(
ω1i
(
1 + β2
)
− ω2i − β2ω3i
)
f̂ 12i [θ] =
1
1 + β1 + β1β2
·
(
ω1i
(
1 + β2
)
− ω2i − β2ω3i
)
f 22i
[
θ|f̂ 12i [θ]
]
= − β
2
1 + β2
·
(
f̂ 12i [θ] + ω
2
i − ω3i
)
f 23i
[
θ|f̂ 12i [θ]
]
=
1
1 + β2
·
(
f̂ 12i [θ] + ω
2
i − ω3i
)
c∗1i [θ] = c
∗2
i
[
θ|f̂ 12i [θ]
]
= c∗3i
[
θ|f̂ 12i [θ]
]
=
ω1i + β
1ω2i + β
1β2ω3i
1 + β1 + β1β2
.
For economies in Θ2, we obtain that the equilibrium spot prices prescribed for every
θ ∈ Θ2 are:
q1 [θ] = β1
(
ω1
ω2
)ρ
and q2
[
θ|f̂ 1 [θ]
]
= β2
(
ω2
ω3
)ρ
.
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Thus, the competitive net trade allocations are:
f̂ 11i [θ] = −
ω1i
(
β2
(
ω3
ω2
)1−ρ
+ 1
)
−
(
ω1
ω2
)(
ω2i + β
2ω3i
(
ω2
ω3
)ρ)
1 + 1
β1
(
ω1
ω2
)1−ρ
+ β2
(
ω3
ω2
)1−ρ
f̂ 12i [θ] =
ω2
ω1
·
ω1i
(
β2
(
ω3
ω2
)1−ρ
+ 1
)
−
(
ω1
ω2
)(
ω2i + β
2ω3i
(
ω2
ω3
)ρ)
1 + β1
(
ω2
ω1
)1−ρ
+ β1β2
(
ω3
ω1
)1−ρ
f 22i
[
θ|f̂ 12i [θ]
]
= −
f̂ 12i [θ] + ω
2
i − ω3i
(
ω2
ω3
)
1 + 1
β2
(
ω2
ω3
)1−ρ
f 23i
[
θ|f̂ 12i [θ]
]
=
ω3
ω2
·
f̂ 12i [θ] + ω
2
i − ω3i
(
ω2
ω3
)
1 + β2
(
ω3
ω2
)1−ρ ,
while the corresponding equilibrium consumption allocations are:
c∗1i [θ] =
ω1i + β
1ω2i
(
ω1
ω2
)ρ
+ β1β2ω3i
(
ω1
ω3
)ρ
1 + β1
(
ω2
ω1
)1−ρ
+ β1β2
(
ω3
ω1
)1−ρ
c∗2i
[
θ|z∗1 [θ]
]
=
ω2
ω1
· c∗1i [θ]
c∗3i
[
θ|z∗1 [θ]
]
=
ω3
ω1
· c∗1i [θ] .
The backward competitive solution of an economy θ is a SCF f̄ =
(
f̄ 1 [·] , f̄ 2 [·|·]
)
associat-
ing the period-1 function f̄ 1 [θ] with the backward TP1 competitive net trade allocation f̂ 1 [θ],
that is, f̄ 1 [θ] = f̂ 1 [θ] ∈ Z̄1, and the period-2 function f̄ 2 [θ|·] with the TP2 competitive net
trade allocation for any TP1 net trade allocation in the set Z̄1, that is, f̄ 2 [θ|z1] = f 2 [θ|z1] for
every z1 ∈ Z̄1. Thanks to Condition 1, we can now state and prove the following permissive
result.
Claim 2 Assume that I ≥ 2. Suppose that the quantity ωti is strictly positive for every
agent i and every consumption period t = 1, 2, 3. Then, the backward competitive solution
f̄ is one-step-ahead implementable if it is defined either over Θ1 or over Θ2.
Proof. Let the premises hold. To show that f̄ is one-step-ahead implementable when it is
defined either over Θ1 or over Θ2, we need to show that this solution satisfies one-step-ahead
Maskin monotonicity and one-step-ahead no veto-power.
One-step-ahead no veto-power is satisfied since agents’ reduced utilities are strictly
monotonic in consumption. Let Y 1 = Y−2 = Z̄1 and let Y 2 (z1) = Z̄2 (z1) for every z1 ∈ Z̄1.
Then, the sets Y 1 = Y−2 and Y 2 (z1) are not empty sets. One can see that parts a) and b) of
requirement (i) are satisfied, too. From these definitions, one can see that f̄ is one-step-ahead
Maskin monotonic.
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4.2 Period-by-period implementability of the Condorcet winner
In this section, we consider a bi-dimensional policy space where an odd number of agents
vote sequentially on each dimension and where an ordering of the dimensions is exogenously
given. We assume that a majority vote is organized around each policy dimension and that
the outcome of the first majority vote is known to the voters at the beginning of the second
voting stage. This stage-by-stage resolution is common in political economy models (see,
e.g., Persson and Tabellini, 2000). We are interested in one-step-ahead implementing the
simple majority solution, which selects the Condorcet winner in each voting stage.
A policy choice is an ordered pair (x1, x2) ∈ X1×X2, where the policy space of dimension
d = 1, 2 is an open interval.18 Each voter i is described by a one-dimensional type θi. The
type space is the open interval
(
η, η̄
)
.
Assumption 3 The voter i’s utility function Ui : X1 × X2 ×
(
η, η̄
)
→ R is a twice-
continuously differentiable satisfying, for every (x1, x2) ∈ X1 ×X2:
(a) Strict concavity, that is:
∂2Ui(x
1, x2, θi)
∂2x1
< 0 and
∂2Ui(x
1, x2, θi)
∂2x2
< 0.
(b) induced single-crossing property, that is:
∂2Ui(x
1, x2, θi)
∂θi∂x1
> 0 and
∂2Ui(x
1, x2, θi)
∂θi∂x2
> 0,
for every θi ∈
(
η, η̄
)
.
(c) Strategic complementarity, that is:
∂2Ui(x
1, x2, θi)
∂x1∂x2
≥ 0.
Note that each voter’s utility depends only on the outcomes and his own type (private
values). Also, note that the induced single-crossing property simply requires that the induced
utility of both dimensions is increasing in the type of voter. This property can also be found
in De Donder et al. (2012).
We now introduce the definition of a Condorcet winner for an arbitrary policy space P :
Definition 9 Suppose that agents in I votes over the set of policies P . We say that p ∈ P
is a majority voting outcome, also known as a Condorcet winner (CW ), if there does not
exist any other distinct outcome p′ ∈ P that is strictly preferred by more than half of voters
to the outcome p.
For any integer k ≥ 2, the set of states Θ takes the structure of the Cartesian product
of allowable independent types for voters, that is, Θ ≡
(
η, η̄
)2k−1
, with θ as typical element.
It simplifies the argument, and causes no loss of generality, to assume that θ1 ≤ θ2 ≤ · · · ≤
θ2k−1. Therefore, the type θk is the median type, denoted by θmed, at state θ.
18The choice of a bi-dimensional policy space is motivated by convenience.
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At the state θ, each voter is assumed to have an ordering preference relation Ri (θ) over
the policy space X1 × X2 which is represented by Ui (·, ·, θi). Below we write Ui (·, ·, θ) for
Ui (·, ·, θi).
If x1 ∈ X1 is the outcome of the first majority voting, then the stage-2 majority voting
function f 2 : Θ|x1 → X2 is defined as follows:
f 2
[
θ|x1
]
= CW
(
U
[
θ|x1
])
,
where CW (U [θ|x1]) denotes the Condorcet winner under the profile U [θ|x1]. It will be
shown below that this outcome is the most-preferred outcome of the median type.
Let us suppose that the stage-2 majority voting function is well-defined for every out-
come x1 ∈ X1. Then, the stage-1 majority voting function f 1 : Θ → X1 is defined as
follows:
f 1 [θ] = CW
(
U
[
θ|f 2
])
, for every θ ∈ Θ,
where CW (U [θ|f 2]) denotes the Condorcet winner under the profile U [θ|f 2].
Definition 10 The SCF f (·) = (f 1 [·] , f 2 [·|·]) on Θ is the majority voting solution if for
every θ ∈ Θ:
f 1 [θ] = CW
(
U
[
θ|f 2
])
and f 2
[
θ|x1
]
= CW
(
U
[
θ|x1
])
for every x1 ∈ X1.
The following lemma shows that the majority voting solution is a single-valued function.
The intuition behind it is similar to that of Proposition 4 of De Donder et al. (2012) for
the case where there is a continuum of voters. Firstly, the assumption of strict concavity
assures the existence and unicity of the Condorcet winner in the second voting stage. This as-
sumption, combined with the assumption of strategic complementarity and with the induced
single-crossing property, assures that the stage-1 induced utility of voter i on X1 in state θ
at the majority voting function f 2 [θ|·] is single-crossing. This guarantees the existence and
unicity of the Condorcet winner in the first voting stage.
Lemma 1 Suppose that the cardinality of I is 2k − 1 with k ≥ 2. Suppose that voter
i ∈ I’s utility function Ui on X1 × X2 × Θ meets the requirements of Assumption 3 and
depends only on her own type. Then, the majority voting SCF f (·) = (f 1 [·] , f 2 [·|·]) over Θ
is a single-valued function on each policy dimension.
Proof. See Appendix.
Thanks to the above lemma, we can now state and prove the main result of this section.
Claim 3 Suppose that the cardinality of I is 2k− 1 with k ≥ 2. Suppose that voter i ∈ I’s
utility function Ui on Θ × X1 × X2 meets the requirements of Assumption 3 and depends
only on her own type. Then, the majority voting solution is one-step-ahead implementable.
Proof. Let the premises hold. By Theorem 2, it suffi ces to show that the majority voting
solution satisfies the feasibility condition, one-step-ahead Maskin monotonicity and one-step-
ahead no veto-power. Let Y 1 = X1 and Y 2 (x1) = X2 for every x1 ∈ X1. One can see that
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parts a) and b) of requirement (i) are satisfied. Moreover, since in each period agents have
single crossing preferences, one can see that the majority voting solution is one-step-ahead
Maskin monotonic. Finally, since one-step-ahead no veto-power is vacuously satisfied, we
conclude that the majority voting solution on Θ is one-step-ahead implementable.
5. Conclusion
We have identified a necessary condition for one-step-ahead implementability, one-step-
ahead Maskin monotonicity. First, this condition guarantees that the set of period-t attain-
able outcomes is never empty, after every outcome history. This allows us to derive agents’
reduced preferences for each period t. Each reduced preference ordering is constructed in the
manner of backward-induction. This means that a period-t reduced preference ordering over
the current component set depends on past decisions as well as on the socially optimal path
that the dynamic process will bring about in the future. Second, it states that every period-t
SCF needs to satisfy a remarkably strong invariance condition for Nash implementation, now
widely referred to as Maskin monotonicity (Maskin, 1999). We have also shown that under
the auxiliary condition of no veto-power, one-step-ahead Maskin monotonicity is suffi cient,
as well.
We have applied our analysis to two prominent dynamic problems, voting over time and
sequential trading. In the voting application, we have shown that on the domain satisfying
the single-crossing property the simple majority solution, which selects the Condorcet winner
in each voting stage (after every history), is one-step-ahead implementable.
In a borrowing-lending model with no liquidity constraints, in which agents trade in
spot markets and transfer wealth between any two periods by borrowing and lending, we
have noted that intertemporal pecuniary externalities arise because today’s trade changes
the spot price of tomorrow, which, in turn, affects its associated equilibrium allocation. The
quantitative implication of this is that every agent’s reduced utility concerns not only her
own consumption/saving behavior but also the consumption/saving behavior of all other
agents. In this set-up, we have shown that, under such pecuniary externalities, the standard
dynamic competitive equilibrium solution is not one-step-ahead implementable. However,
we have also identified preference domains — which involve no pecuniary externalities —
for which the no-commitment version of the dynamic competitive equilibrium solution is
definable and one-step-ahead implementable. It remains an open question how we should
deal with intertemporal pecuniary externalities. We hope that this and other topics related
to this paper will be investigated in future research.
The paper has focused on full implementation under complete information, and so it
has ruled out dynamic uncertainty both as arrival of private information and as arrival of
common shocks. Whereas the latter type of uncertainty can easily be accommodated and
shocks could even be made path-dependent, it is less obvious how to model the former type
of dynamic uncertainty. In this regard, the recent works on dynamic mechanism design such
as Bergemann and Välimäki (2010), Athey and Segal (2013), Pavan et al. (2014) and Eső
and Szentes (2017) can be helpful when integrating this type of dynamic uncertainty.
Finally, though the main motivation of one-step-ahead implementation is practical, our
characterization result offers little insight on the properties that more realistic mechanisms
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should satisfy, in order to ensure one-step-ahead implementation. In this regard, a more
pragmatic approach to one-step-ahead implementation is needed. One promising possibility
seems to be the implementation model developed by Ollár and Penta (2017). These au-
thors circumvents the complications of our mechanisms by studying full implementation via
transfer schemes, under general restrictions on agents’beliefs.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. Let the premises hold. Thus, there exists Γ ≡ (I, H,A (H) , g) that
one-step-ahead implements f . Fix any sθ̄ ∈ SPE
(
Γ, θ̄
)
. Then, sθ̄|ht is a Nash equilibrium
of
(
Γ (ht) , θ̄
)
for every history ht ∈ H. Moreover, by one-step-ahead implementability of f ,
it also follows that:
f+t
[
θ̄|g−t (h)
]
= g+t
(
sθ̄|h
)
, for every h ∈ H t with 2 ≤ t ≤ T . (8)
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Fix any period t 6= 1. Let us define the sets Y−t, Y 1 and Y t (g−t (h)) as follows:
Y 1 ≡
{
g1
(
a
(
h1
))
∈ X1|for some a
(
h1
)
∈ A
(
h1
)}
,
Y−t ≡
{
g−t (h) ∈ X−t|for some h ∈ H t
}
,
Y t
(
g−t (h)
)
≡
{
gt (a (h)) ∈ X t|a (h) ∈ A (h)
}
,
for every g−t (h) ∈ Y−t. By their definitions as well as by the assumption that the dynamic
mechanism Γ one-step-ahead implements f , one can check that f t [Θ|g−t (h)] ⊆ Y t (g−t (h))
and that f 1 [Θ] ⊆ Y 1. Thus, part a) of requirement (i) is met.
Moreover, given that Γ is a dynamic mechanism, one can also check that for every period
t 6= 1:
g−t (h) ∈ Y−t ⇐⇒ g1
(
a1
)
∈ Y 1 and gτ (aτ ) ∈ Y τ
(
g−τ
(
a1, · · · , aτ−1
))
for every τ such that 2 ≤ τ ≤ t − 1, for every h ≡ (a1, · · · , at−1) ∈ H t. This shows part b)
of requirement (i). Thus, f is a feasible SCF.
Next, fix any g−T (h) ∈ Y−T with h ∈ HT and suppose that for every i ∈ I, it holds
that:
LθY T (g−T (h))
(
fT
[
θ|g−T (h)
]
, Ui
[
·, θ|g−T (h)
])
(9)
⊆ Lθ̄Y T (g−T (h))
(
fT
[
θ|g−T (h)
]
, Ui
[
·, θ̄|g−T (h)
])
.
We show that fT
[
θ|g−T (h)
]
= fT
[
θ̄|g−T (h)
]
.
Since Γ one-step-ahead implements f , we have that gT (sθ (h)) = fT
[
θ|g−T (h)
]
and
that sθ (h) ∈ NE
(
Γ̃ (h) , U
[
θ|g−T (h)
])
.19 Since (9) holds, one can see that sθ (h) ∈
NE
(
Γ̃ (h) , U
[
θ̄|g−T (h)
])
. Then, from the definition of Ui
[
·, θ̄|g−T (h)
]
in (1), one can
see sθ (h) ∈ NE
(
Γ (h) , θ̄
)
. By implementability, it follows that gT
(
sθ (h)
)
= fT
[
θ̄|g−T (h)
]
,
and so fT
[
θ|g−T (h)
]
= fT
[
θ̄|g−T (h)
]
, as was to be proved.
Fix any t 6= 1, T and consider any g−t (h) ∈ Y−t with h ∈ H t. Suppose that for every
i ∈ I, it holds that:
LθY t(g−t(h))
(
f t
[
θ|g−t (h)
]
, Ui
[
·, θ|g−t (h) , f+(t+1)
])
(10)
⊆ Lθ̄Y t(g−t(h))
(
f t
[
θ|g−t (h)
]
, Ui
[
·, θ̄|g−t (h) , f+(t+1)
])
.
We show that f t [θ|g−t (h)] = f t
[
θ̄|g−t (h)
]
.
Since Γ one-step-ahead implements f , we have that f t [θ|g−t (h)] = gt
(
sθ (h)
)
. Since
(10) holds, one can see that sθ (h) ∈ NE
(
Γ̃ (h) , U
[
θ̄|g−t (h) , f+(t+1)
])
. From the definition
19For any dynamic mechanism Γ and any history h ∈ Ht, Γ̃ (h) ≡
(∏
i∈I
Ai (h) , g
t
)
denotes the sta-
tic period-t mechanism of Γ after the history h. A period-t mechanism Γ̃ (h) and a profile of period-
t reduced utilities at θ̄|y−t, where y−t = g−t (h), induce a period-t game
(
Γ̃ (h) , U
[
θ̄|y−t, f+(t+1)
])
.
NE
(
Γ̃ (h) , U
[
θ̄|y−t, f+(t+1)
])
denotes the set of period-t Nash equilibria at U
[
θ̄|y−t, f+(t+1)
]
. It is plain
that
(
Γ̃ (h) , U
[
θ̄|y−t, f+(t+1)
])
differs from the dynamic game
(
Γ (h) , θ̄
)
.
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of Ui
[
·, θ̄|y−t, f+(t+1)
]
given in (3), and from (8), it follows that for every i ∈ I and ai (h) ∈
Ai (h), it holds that:
Ui
(
g−t (h) , gt
(
sθ (h)
)
, g+(t+1)
(
sθ̄|
(
h, sθ (h)
))
, θ̄
)
≥ (11)
Ui
(
g−t (h) , gt
(
ai (h) , s
θ
−i (h)
)
, g+(t+1)
(
sθ̄|
(
h,
(
ai (h) , s
θ
−i (h)
)))
, θ̄
)
.
Since f is one-step-ahead implementable and θ̄ ∈ Θ, there exists sθ̄ ∈ SPE
(
Γ, θ̄
)
. Recall
that h ∈ H t, where t 6= 1, T . For each i and each a (h) ∈ A (h), let si denote agent i’s strategy
according to which si|h′ = sθ̄i |h′ for every h′ ∈ H| (h, a (h)) and si (h) = sθi (h). Note that
s|h′ is a Nash equilibrium of
(
Γ (h′) , θ̄
)
for every h′ ∈ H| (h, a (h)) since sθ̄ ∈ SPE
(
Γ, θ̄
)
.
Thus, to have that s ∈ SPE
(
Γ (h) , θ̄
)
, we need to show that s|h ∈ NE
(
Γ (h) , θ̄
)
.
Since the action profile s (h) ∈ NE
(
Γ̃ (h) , U
[
θ̄|g−t (h) , f+(t+1)
])
, it follows that (11)
holds for every i ∈ I and every ai (h) ∈ Ai (h). Thus, no agent i can gain by deviating
from the action si (h) and thereafter conforming to si. Since the one deviation property (see,
e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994; Lemma 98.2) holds for a finite-horizon multi-period
game with observed actions and simultaneous moves, it follows that the strategy profile
s|h ∈ NE
(
Γ (h) , θ̄
)
, and so s ∈ SPE
(
Γ (h) , θ̄
)
. Since Γ one-step-ahead implements f and
gt
(
sθ (h)
)
= gt (s (h)), we have that f t
[
θ̄|g−t (h)
]
= f t [θ|g−t (h)], as we sought.
Finally, suppose that for every i ∈ I, it holds that:
LθY 1
(
f 1 [θ] , Ui
[
·, θ|f+2
])
⊆ Lθ̄Y 1
(
f 1 [θ] , Ui
[
·, θ̄|f+2
])
. (12)
Since Γ one-step-ahead implements f , we have that f 1 [θ] = g1
(
sθ (h1)
)
. Since (12)
holds, one can see that sθ (h1) ∈ NE
(
Γ̃ (h1) , U
[
θ̄|f+2
])
. From the definition of Ui
[
·, θ̄|f+2
]
given in (5), and from (8), it follows that for every i ∈ I and ai (h1) ∈ Ai (h1), it holds that:
Ui
(
g1
(
sθ
(
h1
))
, g+2
(
sθ̄|
(
h1, sθ
(
h1
)))
, θ̄
)
≥
Ui
(
g1
(
ai
(
h1
)
, sθ−i
(
h1
))
, g+2
(
sθ̄|
(
h1,
(
ai
(
h1
)
, sθ−i
(
h1
))))
, θ̄
)
.
Since f is one-step-ahead implementable and θ̄ ∈ Θ, there exists sθ̄ ∈ SPE
(
Γ, θ̄
)
.
For each i and each a (h1) ∈ A (h1), let si denote agent i’s strategy according to which
si|h′ = sθ̄i |h′ for every h′ ∈ H|a (h1) and si (h1) = sθi (h1). By arguments similar to those
used above to prove that f t
[
θ̄|g−t (h)
]
= f t [θ|g−t (h)], one can see that f 1
[
θ̄
]
= f 1 [θ], as
we sought.
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof is based on the construction of a dynamic mechanism
Γ, where each period-t mechanism is a canonical mechanism.
Period-1 mechanism:
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Individual i’s period-1 action space is defined by:
Ai
(
H1
)
≡ U
[
Θ|f+2
]
× Y 1 ×Z+,
where Z+ is the set of nonnegative integers and H1 is the null set. Thus, a period-1 ac-
tion of agent i consists of an element of the set Y 1, an element of the period-1 domain of
reduced utilities induced by the set Θ at the socially optimal 2-tail outcome paths f+2,
and a nonnegative integer. A typical period-1 action played by agent i is denoted by
ai (h
1) ≡
((
U
[
θ̄|f+2
])i
, (x1)
i
, (z)i
)
.
Period-1 action space of agents is the product space:
A
(
H1
)
≡
∏
i∈I
Ai
(
H1
)
,
with a (h1) as a typical period-1 action profile.
The period-1 outcome function g1 is defined by the following three rules:
Rule 1: If ai (h1) ≡
(
U
[
θ̄|f+2
]
, x1, 0
)
for every i ∈ I and x1 = f 1
[
θ̄
]
, then g1 (a (h)) = x1.
Rule 2: If n − 1 agents play aj (h1) ≡
(
U
[
θ̄|f+2
]
, x1, 0
)
with x1 = f 1
[
θ̄
]
but agent i plays
ai (h
1) ≡
((
U
[
θ̄|f+2
])i
, (x1)
i
, (z)i
)
6= aj (h1), then we can have two cases:
1. If Ui
[
x1, θ̄|f+2
]
≥ Ui
[
(x1)
i
, θ̄|f+2
]
, then g1 (a (h1)) = (x1)i.
2. Otherwise, g1 (a (h1)) = x1.
Rule 3: Otherwise, an integer game is played: identify the agent who plays the highest
integer (if there is a tie at the top, pick the agent with the lowest index among them.) This
agent is declared the winner of the game, and the alternative implemented is the one she
selects.
Period-t mechanism with t 6= 1, T :
Individual i’s period-t action space after history h ∈ H t such that g−t (h) ∈ Y−t is
defined by:
Ai (h) ≡ U
[
Θ|g−t (h) , f+(t+1)
]
× Y t
(
g−t (h)
)
×Z+.
Thus, a period-t action of agent i after history h ∈ H t consists of an element of the set
Y t (g−t (h)), an element of the period-t domain of reduced utilities induced by the set Θ at
the t-head outcome path g−t (h) and at the socially optimal t+ 1-tail outcome paths f+(t+1),
and a nonnegative integer. A typical period-t action played by agent i after history h ∈ H t
is denoted by ai (h) ≡
((
U
[
θ̄|g−t (h) , f+(t+1)
])i
, (xt)
i
, (z)i
)
.
Period-t action space of agents after history h ∈ H t is the product space:
A (h) ≡
∏
i∈I
Ai (h) ,
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with a (h) as a typical period-t action profile after history h ∈ H t.
The period-t outcome function gt is defined by the following three rules for every h ∈ H t
such that g−t (h) ∈ Y−t:
Rule 1: If ai (h) ≡
(
U
[
θ̄|g−t (h) , f+(t+1)
]
, xt, 0
)
for every i ∈ I and xt = f t
[
θ̄|g−t (h)
]
, then
gt (a (h)) = xt.
Rule 2: If n − 1 agents play aj (h) ≡
(
U
[
θ̄|g−t (h) , f+(t+1)
]
, xt, 0
)
with xt = f t
[
θ̄|g−t (h)
]
but agent i plays ai (h) ≡
((
U
[
θ̄|g−t (h) , f+(t+1)
])i
, (xt)
i
, (z)i
)
6= aj (h), then we can have
two cases:
1. If Ui
[
xt, θ̄|g−t (h) , f+(t+1)
]
≥ Ui
[
(xt)
i
, θ̄|g−t (h) , f+(t+1)
]
, then gt (a (h)) = (xt)i.
2. Otherwise, gt (a (h)) = xt.
Rule 3: Otherwise, an integer game is played: identify the agent who plays the highest
integer (if there is a tie at the top, pick the agent with the lowest index among them.) This
agent is declared the winner of the game, and the alternative implemented is the one she
selects.
Period-T mechanism:
Individual i’s period-T action space after history h ∈ HT such that g−T (h) ∈ Y−T is
defined by:
Ai (h) ≡ U
[
Θ|g−T (h)
]
× Y T
(
g−T (h)
)
×Z+.
Thus, a period-T action of agent i after history h ∈ HT consists of an element of the set
Y T
(
g−T (h)
)
, an element of the period-T domain of reduced utilities induced by the set Θ
and the T -head outcome path g−T (h), and a nonnegative integer. A typical period-T action
played by agent i after history h ∈ HT is denoted by ai (h) ≡
((
U
[
θ̄|g−T (h)
])i
,
(
xT
)i
, (z)i
)
.
Period-T action space of agents after history h ∈ HT is the product space:
A (h) ≡
∏
i∈I
Ai (h) ,
with a (h) as a typical period-T action profile after history h ∈ HT .
The period-T outcome function gT is defined by the following three rules for every
h ∈ HT such that g−T (h) ∈ Y−T :
Rule 1: If ai (h) ≡
(
U
[
θ̄|g−T (h)
]
, xT , 0
)
for every i ∈ I and xT = fT
[
θ̄|g−T (h)
]
, then
gT (a (h)) = xT .
Rule 2: If n − 1 agents play aj (h) ≡
(
U
[
θ̄|g−T (h)
]
, xT , 0
)
with xT = fT
[
θ̄|g−T (h)
]
but
agent i plays ai (h) ≡
((
U
[
θ̄|g−T (h)
])i
,
(
xT
)i
, (z)i
)
6= aj (h), then we can have two cases:
1. If Ui
[
xT , θ̄|g−T (h)
]
≥ Ui
[(
xT
)i
, θ̄|g−T (h)
]
, then gT (a (h)) =
(
xT
)i
.
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2. Otherwise, gT (a (h)) = xT .
Rule 3: Otherwise, an integer game is played: identify the agent who plays the highest
integer (if there is a tie at the top, pick the agent with the lowest index among them.) This
agent is declared the winner of the game, and the alternative implemented is the one she
selects.
Let
H ≡
⋃
t∈T
H t
be the set of all possible histories, let Ai ≡
⋃
h∈H
Ai (h) be the set of all actions for agent i ∈ I,
let A (H) be the set of all profiles of actions available to agents, defined by
A (H) ≡
⋃
h∈H
A (h) ,
and let g ≡
(
g1, · · · , gT
)
be the sequence of outcome functions, one for each period t ∈ T .
Note that g satisfies the following properties: a) the outcome function g1 assigns to period-1
action profile a (h1) ∈ A (h1) a unique outcome in Y 1, and b) for every period t 6= 1 and every
nontrivial history h ∈ H t, the outcome function gt assigns to each period-t action profile
a (h) ∈ A (h) a unique outcome in Y t (g−t (h)). Thus, by construction, Γ ≡ (I, H,A (H) , g)
is a dynamic mechanism.
Fix any state θ ∈ Θ.
Let us first prove part (a) of Definition 1. Let us define agent i ∈ I’s strategy sθi : H →
Ai by:
sθi
(
h1
)
=
(
U
[
θ|f+2
]
, f 1 [θ] , 0
)
,
sθi (h) =
(
U
[
θ|g−t (h) , f+(t+1)
]
, f t
[
θ|g−t (h)
]
, 0
)
,
for every h ∈ H t with t 6= 1, T , and
sθi (h) =
(
U
[
θ|g−T (h)
]
, fT
[
θ|g−T (h)
]
, 0
)
,
for every h ∈ HT . To complete the proof of part (a), it suffi ces to show that sθ ∈ SPE (Γ, θ).
To this end, by the one deviation property, it suffi ces to show that no agent i can gain by
unilaterally deviating from sθi in a single period t and conforming with s
θ
i thereafter.
To this end, note that the action profile sθ (h) falls into Rule 1 for every history h ∈ H,
by construction. Also, for every history h, note that no unilateral deviation of agent i from
sθi (h) can induce Rule 3. Finally, note that each agent reports the true profile of reduced
utilities, after every history.
Now, fix any history h. If agent i deviates from sθi (h) by playing a period-t action
ati 6= sθi (h), then Rule 2 applies. This means that this agent i will obtain an outcome which is
not better than the outcome he obtains by playing sθi (h). Since the choice of history h, as well
as the choice of agent i, is arbitrary, it follows that sθ (h) ∈ NE
(
Γ̃ (h) , U [θ|f+2]
)
if h ∈ H1,
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sθ (h) ∈ NE
(
Γ̃ (h) , U
[
θ|g−T (h)
])
if h ∈ HT , and sθ (h) ∈ NE
(
Γ̃ (h) , U
[
θ|g−t (h) , f+(t+1)
])
if h ∈ H\
(
H1 ∪HT
)
. By definitions of reduced utilities provided in (1), (3) and (5), and
by definition of sθ, one can see sθ|h ∈ NE (Γ (h) , θ) for every history h ∈ H, and so
sθ ∈ SPE (Γ, θ). This proves part (a) of Definition 1.
Next, let us prove part (b) of Definition 1. We prove it only for the case that h ∈ H is
the trivial history. The following arguments can be suitably modified for the case where h
is not a trivial history.
Assume that s ∈ SPE (Γ, θ). Moreover, fix any h∗ ∈ H. Thus, the strategy profile
s|h∗ ∈ NE (Γ (h∗) , θ). Assume, to the contrary, that there is a period t ∈ T as well as a
history ht ∈ H|h∗ such that either f t [θ|g−t (ht)] 6= gt (s (ht)) if t 6= 1, or f 1 [θ] 6= g1 (s (h1))
if t = 1. Among all such histories, let hτ ∈ H|h∗ be one of the longest histories such that
f τ [θ|g−τ (hτ )] 6= gτ (s (hτ )) and f τ̂
[
θ|g−τ̂
(
hτ̂
)]
= gτ̂
(
s
(
hτ̂
))
for every hτ̂ ∈ H| (hτ , sτ (hτ ))
if τ 6= T .
Let us suppose that τ 6= 1, T . Then, s (hτ ) ∈ NE
(
Γ̃ (hτ ) , U
[
θ|g−τ (hτ ) , f+(τ+1)
])
. We
proceed according to whether s (hτ ) falls into Rule 1 or not.
Suppose that s (hτ ) falls into Rule 1 of period-τ mechanism. Thus, gτ (s (hτ )) =
f τ
[
θ̄|g−τ (hτ )
]
for some θ̄, and this outcome is an element of Y τ (g−τ (hτ )). Then, given
that f τ [θ|g−τ (hτ )] 6= gτ (s (hτ )), it follows that f τ [θ|g−τ (hτ )] 6= f τ
[
θ̄|g−τ (hτ )
]
. One-step-
ahead Maskin monotonicity implies that there exists an agent i and a period-τ outcome
yτ ∈ Y τ (g−τ (hτ )) such that
Ui
[
f τ
[
θ̄|g−τ (hτ )
]
, θ̄|g−τ (hτ ) , f+(τ+1)
]
≥ Ui
[
yτ , θ̄|g−τ (hτ ) , f+(τ+1)
]
and
Ui
[
yτ , θ|g−τ (hτ ) , f+(τ+1)
]
> Ui
[
f τ
[
θ̄|g−τ (hτ )
]
, θ|g−τ (hτ ) , f+(τ+1)
]
.
By changing si (hτ ) into ai (hτ ) =
(
U
[
θ|g−τ (hτ ) , f+(τ+1)
]
, yτ , 1
)
, agent i can induce Rule 2
and obtain gτ (ai (hτ ) , s−i (ht)) = yτ , thereby contradicting the fact that s (hτ ) is an element
of NE
(
Γ̃ (hτ ) , U
[
θ|g−τ (hτ ) , f+(τ+1)
])
.
Suppose that s (hτ ) falls into either Rule 2 or Rule 3 of period-τ mechanism. Thus,
for every agent j 6= i, the period-τ outcome determined by this rule is maximal for this j
in Y τ (g−τ (hτ )) according to her period-τ reduced utility Uj
[
·, θ|g−τ (hτ ) , f+(τ+1)
]
. Since the
SCF f satisfies the one-step-ahead no veto-power, this implies that gτ (s (hτ )) = f τ [θ|g−τ (hτ )],
which is a contradiction.
We conclude the proof by mentioning that, suitably modified, the above proof provided
for the case where τ 6= 1, T applies to the case where τ = 1 as well as to the case where
τ = T .
Proof of Lemma 1. Let the premises hold. To save notation, in what follows we write
U (·, ·, θi) for Ui (·, ·, θ). Fix any x1 ∈ X1 and any θ ∈ Θ. Let x2 [η|x1] be the solution to:
∂U(x1, x2, η)
∂x2
= 0.
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By the implicit function theorem, we have that:
∂x2 [η|x1]
∂η
= −
∂2U(x1,x2[η|x1],η)
∂2x2
∂2U(x1,x2[η|x1],η)
∂η∂x2
> 0.
Therefore, the peak for the median type η = θmed is always the peak in the second voting
stage for each x1 ∈ X1. Write x2 [θmed|x1] for the peak of the median type in the second
voting stage conditional on x1.
Since it holds that:
∂U (x1, x2 [θmed|x1] , θmed)
∂x2
= 0,
from the implicit function theorem we obtain that:
∂x2 [θmed|x1]
∂x1
= −
∂2U(x1,x2[θmed|x1],θmed)
∂x1∂x2
∂2U(x1,x2[θmed|x1],θmed)
∂2x2
≥ 0.
Let us show that x2 [θmed|x1] is the Condorcet winner under U [θ|x1] for every x1 ∈ X1.
For every allowable type η ∈
(
η, η̄
)
and policy (x1, x2), let:
Φ(η, x1, x2) = U
(
x1, x2
[
θmed|x1
]
, η
)
− U(x1, x2, η).
Then, for every x2 < x2 [θmed, x1], we have that:
Φ(θmed, x
1, x2) =
∫ x2[θmed|x1]
x2
∂U(x1, z2, θmed)
∂z2
dz2.
Furthermore, for every η > θmed, it holds that:
Φ(η, x1, x2)− Φ(θmed, x1, x2) =
∫ η
θmed
∫ x2[θmed|x1]
x2
∂2U(x1, z2, α)
∂α∂z2
dz2dα > 0.
Since
Φ(θmed, x
1, x2) = U(x1, x2
[
θmed|x1
]
, θmed)− U(x1, x2, θmed) ≥ 0,
it follows that:
Φ(η, x1, x2) > 0,
which, in turn, guarantees that:
U(x1, x2
[
θmed|x1
]
, η) > U(x1, x2, η).
Therefore, for every voter j = k + 1, · · · , 2k − 1, it holds that:
U(x1, x2
[
θmed|x1
]
, θj) > U(x
1, x2, θj).
Likewise, for every x2 > x2 [θmed|x1], one can show that for every voter j = 1, · · · , k− 1
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it holds that:
U(x1, x2
[
θmed|x1
]
, θj) > U(x
1, x2, θj).
Therefore, x2 [θmed|x1] is a Condorcet winner under U [θ|x1], that is, CW (U [θ|x1]) =
x2 [θmed|x1], and so the majority voting function f 2 [·|·] is a single-valued function for every
θ ∈ Θ and every x1 ∈ X1.
Let x [θmed] = (x1 [θmed] , x2 [θmed]) be the global peak for the median type θmed. Next,
we show that x1 [θmed] is the Condorcet winner under U [θ|f 2].
Solving backward, given that the majority voting function f 2 [θ|x1] = x2 [θmed|x1] for
every x1 ∈ X1, we have that the reduced utility of type η is:
V (η, x1) = U(x1, x2
[
θmed|x1
]
, η).
Then, we have that:
∂V (η, x1)
∂x1
=
∂U(x1, x2 [θmed|x1] , η)
∂x1
+
∂U(x1, x2 [θmed|x1] , η)
∂x2
∂x2 [θmed|x1]
∂x1
,
and so, by Assumption 3, it follows that:
∂2V (η, x1)
∂η∂x1
=
∂2U(x1, x2 [θmed|x1] , η)
∂η∂x1
+
∂2U(x1, x2 [θmed|x1] , η)
∂η∂x2
∂x2 [θmed|x1]
∂x1
> 0.
Then, for every x1 ∈ X1, let:
Π(η, x1) = V (η, x1 [θmed])− V (η, x1)
Next, take any x1 < x1 [θmed]. Then, it holds that:
Π(θmed, x
1) =
∫ x1[θmed]
x1
∂V (θmed, z
1)
∂z1
dz1.
Moreover, for every η > θmed, it also holds that:
Π(η, x1)− Π(θmed, x1) =
∫ η
θmed
∫ x1[θmed]
x1
∂2V (α, z1)
∂α∂z1
dz1dα > 0.
Since
Π(θmed, x
1) = V (θmed, x
1 [θmed])− V (θmed, x1) ≥ 0,
we have that:
Π(η, x1) > 0,
which, in turn, guarantees that:
V (η, x1 [θmed]) > V (η, x
1).
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Therefore, for every voter j = k + 1, · · · , 2k − 1, we have that:
V (θj, x
1 [θmed]) > V (θj, x
1).
Likewise, for every x1 > x1 [θmed] one can also show that:
V (θj, x
1 [θmed]) > V (θj, x
1), for every voter j = 1, · · · , k − 1.
We conclude that x1 [θmed] is a Condorcet winner under U [θ|f 2], that is, CW (U [θ|f 2]) =
x1 [θmed], and so the majority voting function f 1 [·] is a single-valued function for every θ ∈ Θ.
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